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Operational decisions can be complicated by the presence of uncertainty. In many cases,
there exist means to reduce uncertainty, though these may come at a cost. Decision makers
then face the dilemma of acting based on current, incomplete information versus investing
in trying to minimize uncertainty. Understanding the impact of this trade-off on decisions
and performance is the central topic of this thesis.
When attempting to construct probabilistic models based on data, operational decisions
often affect the amount and quality of data that is collected. This introduces an exploration-
exploitation trade-off between decisions and information collection. Much of the literature
has sought to understand how operational decisions should be modified to incorporate this
trade-off. While studying two well-known operational problems, we ask an even more basic
question: does the exploration-exploitation trade-off matter in the first place? In the first
two parts of this thesis we focus on this question in the context of the newsvendor problem
and sequential auctions with incomplete private information.
We first analyze the well-studied stationary multi-period newsvendor problem, in which
a retailer sells perishable items and unmet demand is lost and unobserved. This latter
limitation, referred to as demand censoring, is what introduces the exploration-exploitation
trade-off in this problem. We focus on two questions: i.) what is the value of accounting
for the exploration-exploitation trade-off; and, ii.) what is the cost imposed by having
access only to sales data as opposed to underlying demand samples? Quite remarkably,
we show that, for a broad family of tractable cases, there is essentially no exploration-
exploitation trade-off; i.e., there is almost no value of accounting for the impact of decisions
on information collection. Moreover, we establish that losses due to demand censoring (as
compared to having full access to demand samples) are limited, but these are of higher
order than those due to ignoring the exploration-exploitation trade-off. In other words,
efforts aimed at improving information collection concerning lost sales are more valuable
than analytic or computational efforts to pin down the optimal policy in the presence of
censoring.
In the second part of this thesis we examine the problem of an agent bidding on a
sequence of repeated auctions for an item. The agent does not fully know his own val-
uation of the object and he can only collect information if he wins an auction. This
coupling introduces the exploration-exploitation trade-off in this problem. We study the
value of accounting for information collection on decisions and find that: i.) in general the
exploration-exploitation trade-off cannot be ignored (that is, in some cases ignoring explo-
ration can substantially affect rewards), but ii.) for a broad class of instances, ignoring
exploration can indeed produce nearly optimal results. We characterize this class through a
set of conditions on the problem primitives, and we demonstrate with examples that these
are satisfied for common settings found in the literature.
In the third part of this thesis we study the impact of uncertainty in the context of
inventory record inaccuracies in inventory management systems. Record inaccuracies, mis-
matches between physical and recorded inventory, are frequently encountered in practice
and can markedly affect revenues. Most of the literature is devoted to analyzing the cost-
benefit relationship between investing in means to reduce inaccuracies and accounting for
them in operational decisions. We focus on the less explored approach of using available
data to reduce the uncertainty in inventory. In practice, collecting Point Of Sale (POS) data
is substantially simpler than collecting stock information. We propose a model in which
inventory is regarded as a virtually unobservable quantity and POS data is used to infer its
state over time. Additionally, our method also works as an effective estimator of censored
demand in the presence of inaccurate records. We test our methodology with extensive
numerical experiments based on both simulated and actual retailing data. The results show
that it is remarkably effective in inferring unobservable past statistics and predicting future
stock status, even in the presence of severe data misspecifications.
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Operational decisions can be challenging in the presence of uncertainty. A common source
of uncertainty is the fact that the outcome of decisions usually depends on quantities and
phenomena not yet realized; that is, it depends on the future. For example, at the time
of deciding how many items to order, a retailer may not be able to accurately predict the
demand for a product. Uncertainty can also stem from the lack of comprehensive knowledge
of a system: the retailer might not know exactly how many units are currently available
in stock for sale. Though different in nature, both forms of uncertainty affect the outcome
of decisions. In many cases, the main difference lies in the extent to which they can be
reduced.
In broad terms, learning can be defined as the act of reducing uncertainty about a sys-
tem. Learning can be performed in various ways depending on the setting and objectives.
A widely adopted strategy in the Operations world is to decouple the processes of learning
and decision making: the decision maker first uses historical data and statistical methods
to reduce the uncertainty about the future and then makes decisions based on the infor-
mation gathered. If facing not a single but a sequence of decisions, it becomes necessary
to incorporate new information as it becomes available. In many settings, decisions them-
selves affect the collection of information: if the retailer’s orders are too low and he runs
out of stock, he will most likely be unable to observe current demand and thus compromise
his ability to predict future demand. This gives rise to dynamic learning problems. The
main challenge is to incorporate the learning component into the decision making process,
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effectively balancing learning and performance.
In this thesis we explore the effects of uncertainty and learning on well-known operational
problems. In Chapters 2 and 3 we focus on quantifying the effects of the coupling between
decisions and information collection on two well-known problems: the sequential newsvendor
problem and sequential auctions with incomplete private information. In Chapter 4 we focus
on how to improve estimation and forecasting in the presence of stock uncertainty in an
inventory management system.
1.1 Quantifying exploration-exploitation
In many practical situations decision makers have to act based on limited information
and this uncertainty can be reduced by collecting feedback from the environment. Often
decisions themselves influence the amount and quality of information collected and thus not
only immediate profits are affected by current actions, but also future rewards through the
information collection process.
These type of problems are commonly known as dynamic learning problems. The deci-
sion maker faces the following question: should he optimize his decision using the current
information, or should he make a sub-optimal choice with regard to instantaneous rewards
that might improve his knowledge of the system, and lead to better performance in the
future? This is known as the exploration-exploitation trade-off. The key concept is that
decisions not only affect rewards, but also information that is collected to inform future
decisions.
The coupling between decision and learning gained the attention of researches and prac-
titioners early, as they realized it can deeply affect performance. It has been widely studied
in many areas, including Economics, Operations Research and Statistics, among others.
One of the most general models that captures this coupling is known as the Multiarmed
Bandit problem (MAB).
Multiarmed Bandit Problem As described in [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012], “a MAB
problem is a sequential allocation problem defined by a set of actions. At each time step,
a unit resource is allocated to an action and some observable payoff is obtained. The goal
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is to maximize the total payoff obtained in a sequence of allocations [...] Bandit problems
are basic instances of sequential decision making with limited information and naturally
address the fundamental tradeoff between exploration and exploitation in sequential exper-
iments ”. MAB have been widely studied in the literature under several formalizations,
and different metrics have been proposed to evaluate policy performance: regret analysis,
where performance is compared to an oracle that possesses full information, worst-case or
adversarial, where performance is evaluated on a worst-case scenario basis, and Markovian,
where reward distributions evolve stochastically following a Markov chain. Many traditional
sequential decision problems can be framed in a MAB setting. Examples include inventory
and supply chain management with incomplete distributional knowledge, optimal sequential
experimentation, and optimal ad allocation in online settings, among many others.
A common approach in the Operations Research literature is to model incomplete knowl-
edge in a Bayesian setting. In a Bayesian framework unknown quantities, such as unknown
distribution parameters, are assumed to follow a known prior distribution, which is updated
as new information becomes available. Bayesian sequential learning problems are one of the
most notable examples of Markovian bandits. In these cases, the MAB problem can be
formulated as a Markov Decision problem, where the state of the system is given by the
current prior distribution over the unknown quantities (and potentially additional state
variables), and the system evolves as new information is gathered according to Bayes rule.
Bandit problems provide a very general framework to study the interaction between
learning and decision making. However, it is rarely possible to draw general conclusions,
and studies usually rely heavily on the particular structure of each problem. For example,
in one of the classical MAB formulations the number of actions is finite and the (observable)
reward of each action is independent from the rest. In such case the outcome of a particular
decision gives no information on the alternatives and hence acting greedily with respect to
current information can lead to poor performance. In other settings choosing one action
can inform about the reward associated with other actions. These are instances of bandit
problems with correlated rewards. In these cases the value of explicitly exploring becomes
less clear, as learning might take place implicitly.
The study of this implicit learning when rewards are heavily correlated is of central focus
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in the second and third chapters of this thesis. We study two dynamic learning problems
from very different applications that nevertheless share the common feature that actions
inform about other actions’ rewards. In chapter 2 we study the sequential newsvendor
problem with partially known demand distribution. In this problem every order results in
a partial observation of demand and hence improves the knowledge of the cost associated
with all possible orders. In chapter 3 we study the problem of an agent with incomplete
private information bidding on a sequence of repeated auctions. The agent only collects
information about his valuation if he wins the auction and hence his current bid can inform
about the value associated with all future bids.
Much of the literature addressing these and other problems seeks to obtain insight in
understanding how the exploration-exploitation trade-off should impact operational deci-
sions. We ask an even more basic question: does the trade-off matter in the first place? In
other words, to what extent is it necessary to explicitly explore? Quite remarkably we find
that in the problems we analyze, the value of exploring is not significant.
1.1.1 Newsvendor problem
In many business settings, inventory management can be challenging due to uncertainty
about underlying demand. A decision maker must build probabilistic models for future
demand which are estimated based on past data. In practical operational situations, how-
ever, demand information is rarely accessible. Often, only access to some form of distorted
demand is possible, and this distortion is usually impacted by prior operational decisions.
An important example is demand censoring : in many retail environments, demand is only
observable up to the level at which it can be fulfilled. As a result, firms most often only
have access to sales data as opposed to the true, underlying demand.
In Chapter 2 we consider a multi-period newsvendor problem, where a retailer sells
perishable items and has to decide how many units to order for each time period. Unmet
demand is censored. We assume that the retailer does not have a complete knowledge of the
underlying distribution, but rather learns about it as sales realizations are observed. We
consider a Bayesian formulation where one may summarize the state of the system through
the current belief over the demand distribution.
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As we discuss in the literature review below, it is clear from existing studies that ignoring
the exploration-exploitation trade-off is suboptimal and that one should order more than
the myopic solution under fairly general conditions. We focus on more basic issues with
regard to demand censoring. In particular, we consider two fundamental questions. First,
what is the value of accounting for the exploration-exploitation trade-off? We evaluate this
by introducing a novel metric quantifying the losses stemming from ignoring this trade-off,
a quantity we will refer to as the myopic optimality gap. Second, what are the losses due
to censoring? In other words, what is the cost of having access to sales data as opposed
to demand samples? This latter quantity we refer to as the cost of censoring. Quite
remarkably we find that there is essentially no exploration-exploitation trade-off, that is
there is almost no value of accounting for the impact of ordering decisions on information
collection. Moreover, we establish that losses due to demand censoring (as compared to
having full access to demand samples) are limited, but these are of higher order than those
due to ignoring the exploration-exploitation trade-off.
Related literature. A Bayesian approach to inventory management with observable de-
mand was first proposed by [Scarf, 1959], leading to a formulation as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP), with the state given by the current knowledge about the demand distri-
bution. In such a case, decisions do not affect collection of information, and there is no
exploration-exploitation trade-off; the main issue is to deal with the dimensionality of the
state space. In its most general formulation, the problem has an infinite dimensional state;
it can, however, be written as a finite dimensional MDP if the demand distribution is chosen
from a parametric conjugate family. See also [Azoury, 1985] for another early reference on
the topic.
When demand observations are censored, decisions and information collection are cou-
pled, and the problem becomes more challenging. Most of the literature on inventory control
with Bayesian learning has focused on understanding the censored case. The main diffi-
culty is that Bayesian updates lose their conjugate property in the presence of censoring
for most distribution families, and hence the problem becomes intractable. Many studies
have therefore focused on showing structural properties of the optimal policies. [Ding et al.,
2002] (see also the complementary note of [Lu et al., 2005b]) study the censored newsvendor
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problem for general distributions and show that, under certain conditions, the optimal or-
der quantity is greater than the quantity one would order to minimize current single period
cost, also referred to as the myopic quantity. This result was then generalized by [Ben-
soussan et al., 2009a] for arbitrary parametric distributions. The main point is that the
exploration-exploitation trade-off leads to collecting more information for future periods.
This is, broadly speaking, as far as the general case has been characterized.
There exists, however one well known family of distributions that preserves the conju-
gate property even under censoring. First introduced by [Braden and Freimer, 1991], the
newsvendor distributions have been frequently used as a benchmark to study the problem
in a more tractable fashion. [Lariviere and Porteus, 1999] study the non perishable inven-
tory problem with newsvendor demands, and they find that, if demands follow a Weibull
distribution - a particular case of newsvendor- a state space reduction technique can be ap-
plied and the problem can be solved by backward induction. [Bisi et al., 2011] analyze the
same case for perishable and non perishable inventory and they develop a specific recursive
formula for the optimal solution in the perishable case. They also show that the Weibull is
the only case in which such space reduction can be applied.
The effects of demand censoring have been studied in a wide range of environments,
focusing on different aspects of the problem. In particular, many extensions of the base
newsvendor case have been analyzed recently. [Dai and Jerath, 2013] study the impact
of inventory restrictions and demand censoring in sales force compensation contracts, and
[Heese and Swaminathan, 2010] analyze a similar problem when the firm has complete
control over the sales effort. [Chen and Han, 2013] analyze the effects of learning and
censoring on the supply side. [Jain et al., 2014] study the newsvendor problem with censored
demands when sales transaction timing is also available, while [Mersereau, 2014] focus on the
conjunction of demand censoring with inventory record inaccuracies. Most of these papers
rely on strong model assumptions in order to circumvent the complexity of the analysis.
From the computational point of view, heuristics have been developed in the literature to
overcome the intractability of the problem for general prior/demand combinations. [Chen,
2010] and [Lu et al., 2005a] propose heuristics and provide bounds on the optimal quantity.
All of the above papers focus on modeling uncertainty in a Bayesian framework. There
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is also a stream of literature that analyzes the design of policies under different informa-
tional assumptions, when there is no parameterization of the demand distribution. In such
cases, performance is measured through regret, e.g., the gap between the performance of a
policy and that of an oracle with knowledge of the demand distribution. [Kunnumkal and
Topaloglu, 2008] and [Huh and Rusmevichientong, 2009] are example of such approaches.
In that line of work, [Besbes and Muharremoglu, 2013] is related in spirit to the present
study as it measures the impact of demand censoring on performance. However, it does
so under different informational assumptions and through the lens of minimax regret, and
only measures performance through the growth rate of regret.
Finally, we refer to the recent review of [Chen and Mersereau, 2013] for a broader
overview of the literature on demand censoring.
1.1.2 Sequential auctions with incomplete private information
Auctions are a widely adopted allocation mechanism in many economic exchange settings,
and in particular they play a central role in online advertising. In many cases, for example
when an ad has had few or no impressions, advertisers may be uncertain about the value of
the ad and therefore choosing the best bid represents a challenging task: a high bid has the
risk of incurring too much cost on a potentially low value ad, whereas a low bid reduces the
chances of the ad being shown and thus collecting information about its value. As a result,
the present bid affects not only immediate rewards, but also the information collected for
future decisions.
In Chapter 3 we study the exploration-exploitation trade-off in the context of sequential
auctions, where the bidder has incomplete information about his own valuation of the
auctioned item. We consider a sequential problem where identical copies of a good (e.g.
graphical ad impressions in a web page or ads in a sponsored search service) are sold through
a sequence of auctions over time. We focus on the point of view of a particular advertiser
or agent, who is uncertain about the value of the ad and has to decide what bid to place
in each auction. If the agent wins the auction he observes and collects a reward associated
with the display of the ad. We consider a Bayesian formulation where the state of the
system is summarized through the current belief over the ad reward distribution.
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The agent’s decision is not only based on his own reward beliefs, but might also depend
on his beliefs about the bids of the competing players. We will assume that the agent has
access to a competing bid distribution, which summarizes the information about the bids
of the competing players and further that this distribution is stationary over time. [Iyer
et al., 2014] work under similar assumptions as they study a setting, commonly found in
online marketplaces, in which bidders are chosen from a large pool of homogeneous agents.1
They regard the competing bid distribution as an endogenous feature of the market that
can be derived in equilibrium. From a particular agent’s perspective, we regard the com-
peting bid as exogenous and given. Data to construct or approximate such distribution is
commonly available for advertisers in online ad marketplaces, either through past historical
bid information or through services that compute the probability of winning for a particular
bid.
In the present work, we first show that in this problem bidding myopically is subopti-
mal, and the optimal policy always prescribes a higher bid than the myopic one, a result
previously shown in similar settings. With this in mind, we proceed to identify a broad
range of settings where the actual gain from deviating from the myopic bid is limited. In
other words, in many cases there is little value in exploring. In particular, Theorem 3.1 and
Corollary 3.1 in Section 3.2 show that if the competing bid and the prior agent beliefs satisfy
mild conditions, the losses stemming from ignoring exploration grow only logarithmically
with the length of the time horizon and are reduced as the initial uncertainty decreases at
a rate proportional to the prior variance. Our results are developed in a general frame-
work that includes both first-price and second price auctions, and well known families of
distributions.
Related Literature: There is a substantial body of literature that studies online auction
markets from a game theoretic perspective, both in static (see for example [Edelman et al.,
2007] and [Varian, 2007]) and dynamic settings (see [Babaioff et al., 2009] or [Devanur and
Kakade, 2009]). A large portion of the literature focuses on studying market equilibria or
designing efficient mechanisms from the auctioneer point of view. We focus our work on a
1In that case a particular agent is unlikely to participates in an auction with the same competitor twice
and hence, since agents are homogeneous, the competing bid is roughly stationary in the short term.
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particular agent’s perspective, who faces a sequence of auctions and needs to collect infor-
mation to assess the value of the object he is bidding for. Our model formulation resembles
the single agent problem studied in [Iyer et al., 2014], who focus on market behavior and
equilibria rather than the extent to which exploration is necessary for a particular agent.
[Kanoria and Nazerzadeh, 2014] study how to choose reserve prices in repeated second price
auctions with learning. [Li et al., 2010] show that the exploration-exploitation trade-off can-
not be ignored from a mechanism design perspective, as the second price auctions fail to
be incentive compatible when the mechanism does not perform exploration. [Hummel and
McAfee, 2014] study a similar model to ours, from the auctioneers perspective, and they
reach the conclusion that the required degree of exploration is low. Their results, however,
mostly study the dependency on the initial uncertainty in the system, and not the depen-
dency on the time horizon (equivalently the discount rate, as they work with infinite time
horizon), a more common metric in the dynamic learning literature.
From a sequential learning perspective our work is also closely related to the exten-
sive literature on dynamic learning problems and strategic experimentation. We refer the
reader to the very good surveys [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012], in the machine learning
literature, and [Bergemann and Valimaki, 2006] in the economics literature.
1.1.3 Contributions
We next summarize our main contributions of chapters 2 and 3.
1. We introduce a metric, the myopic optimality gap, by which to measure the extent
of the exploration-exploitation trade-off. In particular, we do so by comparing the
performance of an optimal policy to that of a myopic policy that chooses the action
that minimizes current single-period rewards given all the accumulated information.
2. We develop upper bounds for the myopic optimality gap (also bounding the cost of
censoring in the newsvendor case). We show that under broad conditions the gap
becomes negligible for extreme cases of the problem primitives, and characterize the
exact rate of convergence to zero. In particular, we study the the dependence on the
time horizon and the intial uncertainty in the system. For the newsvendor case we
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further establish the result as the service level increases to 1 or decreases to zero: quite
notably, even when the inventory manager selects a low service level and demand is
very often censored, the myopic optimality gap vanishes.
3. In the sequential auctions problem, we characterize a broad class of problem primi-
tives, with minimal distributional assumptions, where the bound on the myopic op-
timality gap holds. We illustrate its applications with examples in different settings
that include first and second price auctions.
4. In the newsvendor case, we take advantage of (widely adopted) distributional as-
sumptions and evaluate the myopic optimality gap in an exact manner for a grid of
all input parameters: time horizon, parameter uncertainty, service level, Weibull pa-
rameter. We show that it is negligible for virtually all parameter combinations, often
on the order of a fraction of a percentage point. In other words, there is almost no
exploration-exploitation trade-off.
Similarly, we evaluate the cost of censoring in an exact manner. We show that while
it is in general of the order of 10%, it is always of a higher order than the myopic
optimality gap. This suggests that effort to improve information collection about lost
sales is more valuable than analytic or computational effort to pin down the optimal
policy in the presence of censoring.
In addition to the above, we note that the finding regarding the exploration-exploitation
trade-off is also relevant from a computational point of view. Implementing myopic poli-
cies is always relatively straightforward while the computation of optimal policies may be
intractable. In other words, our findings suggest that the myopic policy should be not only
computationally attractive but may also be a viable candidate heuristic in cases where the
optimal policy is intractable.
1.2 Estimation and forecasting with partially observable data
Using past data to reduce uncertainty is a fundamental tool for operations researchers and
practitioners. A common complication is that collected data is often subject to different
10
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types of distortion and as a result only partial information is available.
Incomplete data can be attributed to disruptions in data collection and storing, or it
can mean the that part of the data is simply unobservable. Demand censoring, studied
in Chapter 2, is an example of the latter. There are numerous others examples in which
data, due to technical difficulties or more fundamental issues, is not fully available for
use: competitors’ data in commerce, non-logged user data in online applications, customer
preferences in marketing, are only a few examples.
When data is incomplete estimation and forecasting becomes more difficult. A large
body of literature in areas such as Statistics, Operations Research, Economics and Market-
ing, among others, has been devoted to finding methodologies to circumvent this issue. In
the supply chain and inventory management literature, demand censoring has particularly
gained the attention of researchers.
In Chapter 4 we focus on settings in which not only demand is censored, but inventory
information itself is incomplete or inaccurate. Inventory record inaccuracies, mismatches
between physical and recorded inventory, are commonly found in practice as a result of
several unobservable phenomena. We study the problems of estimation and forecasting
in the presence of these inaccuracies, with inventory regarded as a partially observable
quantity.
1.2.1 Estimating inaccurate inventory with transactional data
Accurate stock tracking is a crucial capability in inventory management. In many retail set-
tings, however, stock information can get distorted to produce inaccurate inventory records.
Record inaccuracies can affect normal supply chain operations and lead to poor revenue per-
formance, and therefore means to reduce them or mitigate their impact are very valuable
for retailers.
This problem is important in many retail settings. For example, in very small fast
moving consumer goods shops, such as small grocery stores, the retailer commonly has
very little or no resources to devote to inventory tracking and management, and hence
inventory is virtually an unobservable quantity. Even in large organized retail settings,
where retailers do have electronic inventory records, empirical studies show that inventory
11
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record inaccuracies are common (see for example [DeHoratius and Raman, 2008]). This
problem is not only relevant to retailers, but also to suppliers. Suppliers often cannot
access their customers’ inventory data and, due to the complex nature of supply chains,
they cannot rely on their own delivery data to provide them with an accurate picture of
inventory on their customers.
The main issue with effectively tracking inventory is that there exist phenomena af-
fecting stock that are unobservable to inventory tracking systems. In extreme cases where
there is no such tracking system, even demand and supply can be regarded as unobservable
inventory processes. In less rudimentary cases, other sources of inaccuracy produce mis-
matches between physical and recorded inventory: theft, spoilage and misplacing, among
others, are typical causes. Aware of this problems, retailers must choose between investing
on means to reduce this mismatch, or accounting for it in their operational decisions. As we
discuss in the literature review below, a good portion of the literature has been devoted to
analyzing the cost-benefit relationship between this two options, and in particular to study
how accounting for record inaccuracies should affect operational decisions. We focus our
work on the less explored approach of using available data to reduce the uncertainty in in-
ventory. In particular, we rely on the fact that, typically, collecting sales transaction data is
substantially simpler than collecting physical inventory data. Our main research objective
is then to develop an estimation methodology that uses only point of sale (POS) data, and
potentially some reduced amount of inventory information, to estimate and predict stock
levels.
We propose a model where the inventory evolution is a hidden process that periodically
reveals information about its state, through transactional data. The observable information
is given only by POS transactions, which describe which products where purchased in
the store and when. Our proposed methodology is motivated by settings where inventory
information feedback is very infrequent or simply unavailable; this is the case of micro-
retailers who do not possess the human resources to track their inventory but, with the
help of information technology tools, can effectively record sales of their products. Though
inspired in such extreme cases, our method is indeed applicable more generally: beside POS
data our model can incorporate direct stock information, i.e. inventory inspections, into
12
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the estimation procedure and hence it is readily applicable in a broader range of settings.
We approach the problem by defining a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Inventory evolu-
tion is modeled as an unobservable Markov Chain that emits observable information through
POS transactions. The transitions of the chain reflect the changes in stock as it is subject
to the drivers of inventory evolution: demand, supply and potentially unobserbable effects.
Fitting the parameters of the chain can be interpreted as fitting parametrized models for
the drivers of inventory evolution. Of particular practical interest is the demand process.
Accurately predicting demand is one the main priorities of retailers, and hence a subject of
great interest for researches. In particular, a lot of attention has been given to the estimation
of censored demand, that is, demand that is not observable when the item is out of stock.
As discussed in the literature review, there has been numerous efforts to estimate demand
in the presence of censoring, but most models make use of reliable stock information. In
this sense, our methodology can also be regarded as an effort to estimate censored demand
with inaccurate stock information. It is, to our best knowledge, one of the first efforts to
achieve this goal.
Related literature. This work follows in a stream of inventory management literature
that looks at inventory record inaccuracy and techniques for addressing it. Bensoussan et
al. have a series papers looking at optimal control of partially observed inventory systems.
In particular, [Bensoussan et al., 2007] look at a system where demand is not observed and
inventory is known to be either zero or greater than zero, based on employees zero-balance
walks. [DeHoratius et al., 2008] look at a setting where an invisible demand process affects
inventory levels but is not observed by the retailer. They create a distribution of physical
inventory using Bayesian updating and they propose an audit triggering mechanism based
on the value of perfect information versus the cost to audit. Similarly, in the manufacturing
setting, [Kök and Shang, 2007] determine the optimal dynamic order-up-to policy and
physical inspection schedule, where the order quantity grows as the inter-inspection time
increases, to account for increased uncertainty in the inventory level. [Chen, 2013] study
the case where inventory level is known exactly, but the system can randomly switch to
a faulty state where all sales are blocked, while [Mersereau, 2014] look at the case where
records are inaccurate, the demand distribution is not fully known, and it is updated as
13
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new information becomes available.
Most of the aforementioned papers are mainly focused on finding optimal policies, or
good heuristics, to handle the tradeoff between performing, potentially costly, inventory
inspections and making decisions with inaccurate information. We focus on the estimation
or forecasting phase, a necessary step for most of the optimization models in the literature.
In this sense, our work is closely related to the literature on censored demand estima-
tion. There has been numerous efforts in the Statistics literature to develop estimation
methodologies under censored information, and some have focused on demand censoring in
particular. This is the case, for example, of [Braden and Freimer, 1991] who propose the
widely adopted Newsvendor family of distributions as a candidate for demand distributions
with censored observations. On a related work [Agrawal and Smith, 1996] propose the Neg-
ative Binomial distribution as a good candidate for estimation using sales data. A good
amount of research has also been devoted to study the problem of estimating product level
demand and substitution patterns, in the presence of stockouts. See for example [Musalem
et al., 2010], [Vulcano et al., 2012] or [Conlon and Mortimer, 2012]. In these cases, the
estimation relies deeply on information about the availability of related products, with per-
haps the absence of stockout timing information. Accurate inventory data is hence critical
to obtain reliable results. Alternatively, we focus on the problem of estimating stock status
and inventory evolution parameters with a minimal amount of information, given by POS
data.
Because we model the stock evolution with a HMM, our work is also related to the vast
literature on these models. We refer the reader to [Scott, 2002] for a survey on Bayesian
methods with HMM models. Finally we refer to [Chen and Mersereau, 2013] for a compre-
hensive review of the literature on demand censoring and record inaccuracies.
1.2.2 Contributions
We propose a methodology to estimate inaccurate stock levels, based solely on POS transna-
tional data and, if available, inventory inspection observations. With minimal data, our
method is able to estimate past stock levels and predict future ones, particularly effectively
recognizing in-stock and out-of-stock periods. In this sense, the method can be regarded as
14
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an unsupervised learning methodology for unonbservable inventory.
In addition, our method represents a novel tool to perform demand estimation and
forecasting when demand is censored by inventory, and records are inaccurate. Our ap-
proach can effectively forecast demand based solely on POS data without relying on stock
information.
With extensive numerical experiments, based on both simulated and actual retailing
data, we show that our methodology is remarkably effective in inferring unobservable past




Dynamic learning in the
newsvendor problem
2.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a multi-period newsvendor problem with a finite time horizon consisting of T
periods. We assume zero lead-time. At the beginning of each period, the retailer may order
units, demand is then realized and is fulfilled to the extent possible. If the decision maker
runs out of stock, demand beyond the initial inventory level is lost. On the other hand, we
assume that inventory is perishable, i.e., if items remain, these are discarded.
We assume that the demands are independent and identically distributed, belonging to
a family of distributions parameterized by an unknown parameter θ, which takes values in
the parameter set Θ ⊂ R. Given parameter θ, the demand distribution has a probability
density function denoted by f(·|θ) and a cumulative distribution function denoted by F (·|θ).
Following a Bayesian approach, we assume that the decision maker has a prior distribution
over θ, with a density denoted by π(·).
The retailer incurs a cost h > 0 for each unit of unsold product and a penalty cost
p > 0 for each unit of unmet demand. In other words, the single period cost given stocking
decision y ≥ 0 and realized demand D ≥ 0 is
L(y,D) := h(y −D)+ + p(D − y)+.
16
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC LEARNING IN THE NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM
Let r := p/(h+p) denote the critical ratio, also referred to as the service level . Without loss
of generality, we assume that h = 1 and parameterize the cost structure through r ∈ (0, 1),
i.e.,
L(y,D) := (y −D)+ + r
1− r (D − y)
+.
The retailer can only observe sales, rather than full demand realizations. In period t,
the observed sales are given by min{Dt, yt}, where Dt is the demand realized and yt the




min{D1, y1}, y1, . . . ,min{Dt−1, yt−1}, yt−1
)
.
Note that the information collected about the demand up to period t is impacted by the
past stocking decisions y1, y2, . . . , yt−1.
We assume that E [D1] < ∞, which implies that E [L(y,Dt)] < ∞, for all t = 1, . . . , T
and any y ≥ 0. We denote by Pc the set of non-anticipatory policies with respect to the
censored information system, that is, policies for which the decision prescribed in period t
is Ft-measurable for all t ≥ 1. The objective is to minimize the cumulative expected cost
and the optimal value is given by




Eµ [L(yt, Dt)] ,
where the expectation is taken assuming that decisions are made according to the policy µ.
Since the items are perishable, decisions across periods are only coupled through the
information collected about the unknown parameter θ of the demand distribution. When
deciding on an order quantity in period t, the decision maker has to balance the impact of
this decision on the current single-period cost with the impact on future costs that stems
from the information collection process. This leads to the exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
2.1.1 Quantities of Interest
Our analysis of the newsvendor problem centers on several quantities of interest.
Exploration-exploitation trade-off. Our first goal is to quantify the exploration-exploitation
trade-off. As mentioned in the introduction, it has been shown under general conditions
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that it is optimal to “order more”. That is, in a multi-period problem with censored ob-
servations, a decision maker will want to stock at a level higher than would be optimal to
minimize the current single-period cost. Intuitively, it is desirable to explore by ordering
more so as to reduce the likelihood of censoring and collect more information about the
demand distribution for use in future periods. However, precisely pinning down the op-
timal order quantity is, in general, difficult. As a result, the exact form of what type of
exploration ought to be conducted, and the value associated with it, are not known. To
quantify the exploration-exploitation trade-off, we will isolate the value of exploring (i.e.,
ordering more) by comparing the performance of an optimal policy to that of a policy that
sequentially minimizes current single-period expected costs, fully ignoring the impact of
decisions on information collection. More formally, the latter myopic (i.e., full exploitation)













E [L(ymt , Dt)] .
The myopic policy is perhaps the simplest heuristic to consider as an alternative to the
optimal policy, and leads to a natural upper bound to the optimal cost,
V ∗T ≤ V mT . (2.1)
We are interested in qualifying the relative gap between V mT and V
∗
T , that is, the relative
additional cost incurred by ignoring the exploration-exploitation trade-off and applying a
full exploitation policy. We refer to this as the myopic optimality gap (MOG), formally
defined as
MOG :=
V mT − V ∗T
V ∗T
.
The cost of censoring. Our second goal is to quantify the impact of censoring on the
performance compared to what would be possible if demand samples were fully observable.
Isolating the latter impact yields an estimate of the value associated with collecting infor-
mation on lost sales. If demand is observable, the collection of information is now unaffected
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by the policy used by the decision maker. We denote by
Fot := σ(D1, y1, . . . , Dt−1, yt−1)
the filtration associated with the full observation process. Let Po be the set of admissible
policies for the full observation problem, that is, policies for which prescribed decisions at
period t are Fot -measurable. The optimal cumulative cost for the uncensored problem is
given by




Eµ [L(yt, Dt)] .
In the uncensored case, the information collected about the demand distribution is inde-
pendent of past decisions and there is no exploration-exploitation trade-off. Hence, in this
case, the problem is easy to solve: the optimal decision at time t is to minimize the current
single-period cost. Moreover, clearly Pc ⊆ Po, and it follows that V oT is a lower bound on
V ∗T , that is,
V oT ≤ V ∗T . (2.2)
In order measure the impact of censoring on performance, we introduce the Cost of
Censoring (COC), defined as the relative difference between the optimal costs in the censored
and uncensored systems, that is,
COC :=
V ∗T − V oT
V oT
.
A common upper bound. While we will study the MOG and the COC explicitly, we will
also develop parametric bounds on those quantities through a common upper bound. We
define the myopic cost of censoring (MCC) as
MCC :=
V mT − V oT
V oT
.
It can be interpreted as the relative increase in cost stemming from censoring, when a
myopic policy is applied. Note that (2.1)–(2.2) imply that
MOG =




T − V oT
V oT
, COC =




T − V oT
V oT
.
That is, the MCC provides an upper bound on both the MOG and the COC.
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2.1.2 Demand Distributions and Dynamic Programming Formulation
Beliefs about the demand distribution change with time, as new (potentially censored)
demand realizations are observed. At period t, the current knowledge about θ can be
summarized by the current prior distribution density πt(θ) := π(θ|Ft). The current prior
is updated at every period, following Bayes’ rule. In particular, if, in period t, the order















if z = y,
for θ > 0. Here, F (y|θ) := 1− F (y|θ).
The cost functions and the relative performance gaps were defined in the general setting
with arbitrary demand distributions. As noted earlier in the introduction, such generality
makes dynamic optimization and any type of sensitivity analysis intractable. In line with the
existing literature, we will narrow down our analysis to a subfamily of demand distributions.
Newsvendor distributions. One general class of distributions that preserves the
conjugate property even under censoring are the so-called newsvendor distributions. A
random variable is said to belong to the newsvendor family if its cumulative distribution
function is given by
F (z|θ) := 1− e−θd(z), for all z > 0, (2.3)
where d : R++ → R++ is a differentiable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function. The
parameter space is defined to be Θ := R++ and the prior distribution of θ is assumed to
be a Gamma distribution with shape parameter S ∈ R++ and rate parameter a ∈ R++.
Formally, the prior distribution on θ has a density given by
π(θ|a, S) := S
aθa−1e−Sθ
Γ(a)
, for all θ > 0.
It has been shown citepBraden91 that this family of distributions preserves its structure
even under censored observations, that is, if πt(·) is a Gamma distribution, then so are both
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πot+1(·|z, πt) and πct+1(·|y, πt). In particular, given a demand level z and order quantity y,
the update rules for Gamma distribution hyperparameters (a, S) are given by
at+1 = at + I{z<y}, St+1 = St + d(z ∧ y), (2.4)
where I{·} denotes the indicator function and ·∧· denotes the minimum. Equation (2.4) offers
a natural interpretation of the hyperparameters (a, S): the scale hyperparameter S accounts
for the total quantity of sales observed in the system, while the shape hyperparameter a
counts the number of fully observed demand realizations. The shape hyperparameter plays
a central role in our analysis as it measures the level of information about the unknown
demand parameter θ: the coefficient of variation of the the demand parameter θ given
hyperparameters (a, S) is
CV(θ|a, S) = 1/√a. (2.5)
Hence, higher values of a indicate less uncertainty regarding the value of θ.
Assumptions. For tractability, our analysis focuses on Weibull distributions, i.e.,
newsvendor distributions with
d(z) := z`, for ` > 0.
For the Weibull family, the Bayesian update (2.4) is written at
at+1 = at + I{z<y}, St+1 = St + (z ∧ y)`.
The predictive distribution (the distribution of demand conditional on the current belief
(a, S) for the parameter θ) has density









for z > 0. The predictive distribution is integrable (i.e., the demand has finite expectation)
if and only if a` > 1, and therefore we will assume that this condition is satisfied throughout
the chapter. Note that it suffices to verify that the initial prior distribution of θ satisfies
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a` > 1, since the update rule (2.4) then guarantees that this will continue to hold at all
future times.
Finite dimensional dynamic programs. Given current hyperparameters (a, S) we
denote by V oT (a, S), V
m
T (a, S), and V
∗
T (a, S) the optimal cost function under uncensored
demand, the myopic cost function under censored demand, and the optimal cost function
under censored demand, respectively. Similarly, we define C(a, S) to be the optimal single-
period cost given current hyperparameters (a, S), that is,







In equation (2.8) the expectation is taken with respect to the pair (D, θ), that follows a
newsvendor distribution with parameters (a, S). Unless otherwise stated, this will be the
convention for expectation terms in the remainder of the chapter.
With this notation in mind, we can decompose the cost functions of interest using
standard dynamic programming backward induction.1 To begin, the optimal cost function
under censored demand must satisfy the Bellman equation
V ∗T (a, S) = min
y≥0
{




a+ 1, S +D`
)]
+ P {D ≥ y}V ∗T−1
(
a, S + y`
)}
,
for all (a, S) and all T ≥ 1, with the terminal condition V ∗0 (a, S) = 0, for all (a, S). Similarly,
the myopic cost function under censored demand must satisfy




a+ 1, S +D`
)]
+ P {D ≥ ym}V mT−1
(




for all (a, S) and all T ≥ 1, with the terminal condition V m0 (a, S) = 0, for all (a, S). In (2.9),







Finally, the optimal cost function when demand samples are observable must satisfy




a+ 1, S +D`
)]
, (2.10)
for all (a, S) and all T ≥ 1, with the terminal condition V o0 (a, S) = 0, for all (a, S). Here,
we have used the fact that the optimal policy in this case is myopic.
1The existence of an optimal policy in this setting can be shown by applying Proposition 3.4 of citetbert-
sekas1978.
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2.2 Parametric Bounds and Structural Analysis
As highlighted in Section 2.1.1, the MCC serves as an upper bound for both the MOG and
the COC. In this section, we focus on deriving bounds on the MCC. In doing so, we are able
to jointly consider questions relating to the exploration-exploitation trade-off and the cost-
of-censoring and derive insights on the impact of problem parameters on these quantities.
From an analytical perspective, this approach circumvents the necessity to determine the
optimal solution to the dynamic program associated with the censored demand problem.
Instead, our analysis in this section relies on the performance of myopic policies, which are
more amenable to analysis.
2.2.1 Upper Bounds
We aim to develop an upper bound on V mT (a, S) − V oT (a, S). Rewriting the recursion for
the myopic policy in the censored case (Eq. 2.9) in a way that parallels the recursion for
the observable demand case (Eq. 2.10), one obtains, for all (a, S) and T ≥ 1,




a+ 1, S +D`
)]
+ ΓT−1(a, S), (2.11)
where
ΓT−1(a, S) := (1− r)V mT−1
(











Combining (2.10) and (2.11), one has that
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) = ED
[
V mT−1(a+ 1, S +D




The correction term ΓT−1(a, S) may be interpreted as the additional cost incurred over the
next period due to the presence of censoring.
As a first step towards bounding the performance difference V mT (a, S) − V oT (a, S), we
bound ΓT−1(a, S) as follows.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that the demand distribution is Weibull. For all (a, S) with a` > 1,
and all T ≥ 1,
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where Cot (a, S) is the future expected single-period cost, t periods from now, when demands
are uncensored, i.e.,









Notably, Lemma 2.1 offers a bound on ΓT (a, S) in which all terms depend only on
future costs in the uncensored setting. We further note that Proposition 2.1 holds for any
newsvendor distribution, and not just the Weibull case. The proof, which can be found
in the appendix, is written in general terms. We next use Proposition 2.1 recursively to
provide an explicit bound on V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) by exploiting the Weibull structure2.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that the demand distribution is Weibull. Then, for any ` > 0, T ≥
1, r ∈ (0, 1), a > 0, S > 0 with a` > 1,















where λ := (1− r)1− 1a` and Q(a, r, `) is a function depending only on a, r and `, such that
Q(a, r, l) = O(1/a) as a→∞, when r and ` are fixed.
The theorem provides a bound on the (absolute) myopic cost of censoring as a function
of the problem parameters: the time horizon T , the “uncertainty” parameter a and the
service level r. We first provide a high level overview of the proof of the result and then
analyze in detail the parametric dependence.
The proof of the result is based on two steps. We first develop an intermediate bound
that connects the (absolute) myopic cost of censoring to the difference between the observ-
able demand cost and the expected total cost when the demand parameter θ is known:
V oT−1(a, S)− (T − 1)Co∞(a, S), where









is the expected optimal single-period cost assuming θ is known.3 The latter difference
can be interpreted as the increase in cost stemming from the fact that θ is unknown, in








3Comparing with the definition of CoT (a, S) in (2.13), note that C
o
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an uncensored environment. In a second step, we bound the latter difference based on
the problem parameters by analyzing information accumulation and its implications on
performance in the observable demand case.
Parametric dependence. Using Theorem 2.1, one can characterize the behavior of the
MCC, as a function of the various problem parameters when one approaches the extremes
of the parameter region.
Proposition 2.1 (Time horizon dependence). Suppose that the demand distribution is
Weibull. Then, For any ` > 0, r ∈ (0, 1), a > 0, S > 0 with a` > 1,
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)
V oT (a, S)
= O(T−1 log T ) as T →∞.
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)
V oT (a, S)
= 0 when T = 1.
The result captures the dependence of the MCC on the time horizon T . The fact that the
MCC is equal to zero when T = 1 simply stems from the fact that, in a one period problem,
the censored and uncensored problems are identical, and the optimal decision is myopic.
For large time horizons, the MCC vanishes at rate O(T−1 log T ). This reflects that: (i) over
time, in the censored environment, a myopic decision maker will learn the true demand
parameter θ, as in the uncensored environment4; (ii) the cumulative effects of deviations
from a myopic solution in the censored case cannot affect performance significantly, at least
not more than O(T−1 log T ) in relative terms. (i) reflects the fact that learning takes place
in both observable and censored environments, and provides some initial insights on the
COC. (ii) suggests that the MOG might not be significant, at least in both the extreme
cases when T = 1 and T →∞.
Proposition 2.2 (Prior information dependence). Suppose that the demand distribution is
Weibull. Then for any ` > 0, r ∈ (0, 1), S > 0, T ≥ 1,
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)
V oT (a, S)
= O(1/a) as a→∞.
4Related to this fact is the work of [Bensoussan et al., 2009b], who study the asymptotic properties of
the myopic order quantity ymt as an estimator of the optimal order quantity y
∗
t , for the case of exponentially
distributed demands.
25
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC LEARNING IN THE NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM
In other words, the MCC converges to zero at a fast rate as a→∞. This captures the
behavior of the MCC in a regime in which there is very little prior uncertainty about the
demand distribution parameter θ. In this case, the presence of censoring does not affect
performance significantly, since there is little additional information to be captured.
Proposition 2.3 (Service level dependence). Suppose that the demand distribution is
Weibull. Then for any ` > 0, a > 0, S > 0, T ≥ 1 with a` > 1,
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)





as r → 1−,
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)





as r → 0+,
The result gives a characterization of the asymptotic properties of the MCC as the service
level r becomes close to 0 or 1, that is, as the holding cost becomes arbitrarily large with
respect to the penalty cost and vice versa.
If the penalty cost is large (i.e., r is close to 1), the myopic order quantity will be high
(corresponding the r-fractile of the predictive distribution) as the decision-maker attempts
to mitigate the large penalties associated with stockouts. This implies that the myopic
policy will often observe full demand realizations, and one expects that the presence of
censoring should not impact performance significantly.
What is more surprising and remarkable, however, is that even when r is close to zero,
and hence the myopic quantity leads the decision-maker to be censored very often, the
performance implications of being myopic are still very limited; the MCC shrinks to zero at
a rate O(r1/`). This stems from the fact that the holding cost is very high and every unit
of unconsumed inventory becomes very expensive, making exploration (or “ordering more”
than myopic) very expensive.
As a corollary of the results above, both the myopic optimality gap and the cost of
censoring become negligible at the boundaries of the input parameters of the problem,
namely when T = 1, T → ∞, a → ∞, r → 0, and r → 1. In Section 2.3, we quantify
more finely the MOG and the COC, as well as their relative magnitudes, by using an exact
analysis to compute these values for various ranges of the parameters of the problem.
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2.2.2 Lower Bound
To complement Theorem 2.1, we next provide a lower bound on the MCC for the case of
exponential demand (` = 1).
Theorem 2.2. Suppose demands are exponential (i.e., ` = 1) and a > 1. Then, for any
T ≥ 2, S > 0 and r ∈ (0, 1),













− T − 1
a+ T − 1
]
. (2.15)
Note that the structure of the lower bound obtained in Theorem 2.2 is similar to the
upper bound given in Theorem 2.1. Indeed, by specializing to the ` = 1 case in (2.14),
Theorem 2.1 implies that
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) ≤ K(r, 1)
λ− λT+1













In particular, the logarithmic dependence with respect to the time horizon T is the best
possible dependence one could obtain for V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S).
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is presented in the appendix. We next describe the key
idea underlying the proof of the result as it leads to additional insights on the extent of
information collection limitation induced by censoring.
The key idea resides in the introduction of an alternative problem with a new information
structure that arises from censoring of a different nature. In particular, we define the random
rejection problem to be one in which, during each time period, either the decision maker fully
observes the realized demand or receives no information at all (this can be interpreted as the
decision maker having access to full demand observations, but lacking access to a fraction
of them). This revelation occurs independently of the order size or the demand realization,
and is based on i.i.d. draws of a Bernoulli random variable with success probability equal to
r. Note that the probability of obtaining no information in any given period is equal to the
probability of observing a censored observation in the original problem when a myopic policy
is applied. The main difference is that, in the original problem every demand realization
provides some level of information, while in the random rejection problem some periods
provide less (no) information and some periods provide more.
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We develop a lower bound on the difference V mT (a, S)−V oT (a, S) as follows. We establish
that the optimal cost in the random rejection case is always lower than that achieved by
the myopic policy in the original censored problem. Given this, one can lower bound
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) by the difference between the cost in the random rejection system and
that in the observable case. The latter two costs are much simpler to characterize as the
update rules do not involve censoring. (Note that, since the information collected at each
time period is independent of the decision rule, the random rejection problem is similar to
the observable demand case in that an optimal policy is myopic and minimizes the expected
current single-period cost.) This yields the bound in (2.15).
One way to interpret the result that the random rejection problem is “easier” than the
censored problem is is that high demand realizations are more informative than low demand
realizations, and therefore the absence of censoring leads to better performance even with
fewer demand observations.
2.3 MOG and COC: Exact Analysis
2.3.1 Scalability
A notable feature of the problem when demand has a Weibull distribution is that the single
period optimal cost possesses the so-called scalability property, namely that
C(a, S) = S1/`C(a, 1), for all a > 1/`, S > 0.
As observed by citetAzoury85 and citetlariviere1999stalking this property can be extended
to the optimal and full observation cost functions: for any a > 1/`, S > 0, T ≥ 1
V ∗T (a, S) = S
1/`V ∗T (a, 1), V
o
T (a, S) = S
1/`V oT (a, 1).
This separability allows the exact cost functions to be determined in the optimal and full
observation cases given only knowledge of V ∗T (a, 1) and V
o
T (a, 1), respectively, for all values
of a > 1/`. Further, exact recursions have been developed for these two quantities in
the existing literature citepAzoury85,lariviere1999stalking,Bisi11, and we will use those to
evaluate these costs.
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A similar reasoning yields that the myopic cost function V mT (a, S) also possesses the
scalability property, and an exact recursion can be used to compute it, as summarized in
the next result.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that demand distribution is Weibull. Then, for all a > 1/`,
S > 0, T ≥ 1,
V mT (a, S) = S
1/`V mT (a, 1).
In addition, for all a > 1/`,




1− (1− r)1− 1a`
)
V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) + (1− r)1−
1
a`V mT−1(a, 1).
In the recursive equation provided by Proposition 2.4, V mT (a, 1) can be computed exactly
given V mT−1(a + 1, 1) and V
m
T−1(a, 1). This implies that V
m
T (a, 1) can be evaluated using
backwards induction, starting with the boundary condition V m1 (a, 1) = C(a, 1). The value of
C(a, 1) itself has no closed form expression, but can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy
by numerical integration for any a. This is analogous to the situation for the value function
of an optimal policy in the censored and full observation cases.
Hence, using the scalability property, the cost functions V mT (a, S), V
∗
T (a, S), and V
o
T (a, S)
can be computed numerically using simplified dynamic programming recursions that are
exact up to errors from numerical integration. In particular, no discretization of the state
space is necessary.
2.3.2 Parametric Setup
We are interested in analyzing the behavior of the MOG and the COC across a broad range
of input parameters. In the case of Weibull demand, the input parameters are given by:
• the Weibull parameter `;
• the shape parameter a of the Gamma prior distribution;
• the scale parameter S of the Gamma prior distribution;
• the time horizon T ; and
• the service level r.
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Given the scalability property discussed in Section 2.3.1, the values of the MOG and the
COC do not dependent on the scale parameter S, since both of these quantities are cost
differences that are normalized relative to a baseline cost. We are therefore left with four
parameters that summarize the three relevant dimensions of the problem: time (T ), cost
structure / service level (r), and the demand uncertainty (a, l). We consider ranges for time
and service level given by
1 ≤ T ≤ 100, r ∈ {0.1, . . . , 0.9, 0.99}.
The demand uncertainty parameters (a, `) are more difficult to directly interpret. In
order to clarify their role, it is convenient to consider two measures of demand uncertainty.
• Conditional on the prior distribution hyperparameters (a, S), we measure the aggre-
gate uncertainty in the next period demand (with predictive distribution (2.6)–(2.7))
through the coefficient of variation of demand, i.e., CV(D|a, S). Note that CV(D|a, S)
is a function of (a, `), but does not depend on the shape parameter S5. In the expo-
nential case (` = 1), for example, one has that CV(D|a, S) =
√
a/(a− 2) for a > 2.
• The aggregate uncertainty is in part driven by the fact that, even absent uncertainty
regarding θ, the demand realizations themselves are random. This can be quantified
by the coefficient of variation of demand given the parameter θ, i.e., CV(D|θ). Here,
demand is assumed to be distributed according to the distribution (2.3). Note that
CV (D|θ) depends on ` but does not vary with θ6 . In the exponential case (` = 1)
one has that CV(D|θ) = 1 for all θ > 0.




5Indeed, if the random variable D follows the predictive distribution (2.7) with parameters (a, S), then
S1/`D follows (2.7) with parameters (a, 1). Thus, changing the parameter S corresponds to rescaling the
random variable, leaving the coefficient of variation unchanged.
6Indeed, if the random variable D follows the demand distribution (2.3) with parameter θ, then θ−1/`D
follows (2.3) with parameter θ = 1. Thus, changing the parameter θ corresponds to a rescaling, and leaves
the coefficient of variation unchanged.
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UR(a, l) is always greater or equal than 1 and is the ratio of the overall, aggregate uncer-
tainty in the next period demand, to the uncertainty that would remain if θ was perfectly
known. From the above discussion, UR is a function of only (a, `). For example, in the
exponential case (` = 1), we have that UR =
√
a/(a− 2) for a > 2.
We will parameterize demand uncertainty through input parameters (UR, `). Note that
we use UR rather than a because it is directly interpretable as the relative value of un-
certainty arising from the fact that θ is unknown. For example, if UR = 3, the demand
uncertainty would be reduced by a factor of three if θ were known.
On the other hand, we interpret the Weibull parameter ` as measuring the uncertainty
of demand realizations given knowledge of θ. From (2.3), it is clear that larger values
of ` lead to faster decaying tails for the demand distribution. Moreover, from the above
discussion, CV(D|θ) depends only on `. If, for example, ` increases, the coefficient of
variation of the Weibull distribution (independent of θ) decreases, and hence there is less
variation in demand realizations. The uncertainty about θ, however, remains constant, cf.
(2.5). Because θ can be learned via demand observations, the potential value of exploration
can be significantly affected by changing `.
In what follows, we will explore the effect of demand uncertainty on the MOG and the
COC.
2.3.3 Analysis of the Myopic Optimality Gap
First, we consider the behavior of the myopic optimality gap, i.e., the relative sub-optimality
of the myopic policy as compared to an optimal policy.
Exponential case. To gain some intuition, we start by considering the case where demands
follow an exponential distribution (` = 1). Figure 2.1 depicts the MOG as a function of the
time horizon T , holding fixed UR = 1.5 and r = 0.8.
We first observe that this curve confirms the results of Proposition 2.1; indeed the MOG
decreases as T grows. The most striking conclusion of Figure 2.1, however, is not the shape
of the function (which was expected given the previous results) but rather the magnitude of
the MOG: the MOG never exceeds .3% over all values of the time horizon tested. This says
that computing an optimal policy and finely balancing the exploration-exploitation trade-
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Figure 2.1: The myopic optimality gap MOG as a function of the time horizon T .
Demand is exponential (` = 1), UR = 1.5, and r = 0.8.
off stemming from demand censoring yields at most 0.3% improvements in costs compared
to a myopic policy that simply orders the best quantity given current information. In other
words, for all practical purposes, there is essentially no exploration-exploitation trade-off in
this case.
To obtain a broader understanding of the behavior and magnitude of the MOG, we next
evaluate it for different values of the uncertainty ratio UR and service level r. In Figure 2.2,
for varying choices of (r,UR), we depict the worst-case myopic optimality gap MOGwc over
time horizons 1 ≤ T ≤ 100, i.e.,
MOGwc := max
1≤T≤100
V mT (a, 1)− V ∗T (a, 1)
V ∗T (a, 1)
. (2.16)
Observe that the MOGwc tends to zero for values of the service level r close to 0 or 1,
consistent with Proposition 2.3. It is also clear that the MOGwc decreases as the uncertainty
ratio UR decreases, consistent7 with Proposition 2.2. However, as was the case in Figure 2.1,
7Note that, for the exponential case, UR =
√
a/(a− 2), and hence a → ∞ as UR → 1. A similar
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Figure 2.2: The worst-case myopic optimality gap MOGwc as a function of r and
UR. Demand is exponential (` = 1).
the most remarkable fact is the magnitude of the MOGwc: the maximum value of the MOG
over all parameters tested is below 0.3%. It is notable that this holds for any service level
r. In particular, even when r is low and censoring occurs often, there is almost no value of
deviating from the myopic policy. In summary, when demand is exponentially distributed,
the value of exploration (or of “ordering more”) is negligible independent of the problem
parameters.
General Weibull case. We now consider the general Weibull case. We are interested
in analyzing the MOG and, in particular, understanding the sensitivity of our conclusions
in the exponential case to changes in the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, `.
In Figure 2.3, for different values of the Weibull parameter ` and varying choices of the
uncertainty ratio UR and the service level r, we depict the worst case myopic optimality
gap MOGwc.
conclusion holds for the general Weibull case.
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Figure 2.3: The worst-case myopic optimality gap MOGwc as a function of `, r,
and UR.
The results show that, for each value of the Weibull parameter `, the overall shape of the
MOGwc curve is similar to the one obtained in the exponential case. The main differences
are given by the location of the worst case service level r value and the order of magnitude
of the gap itself. One observes that the worst-case gap is still below 3% for ` ≤ 3, with
the worst cases given by ` = 7 and UR = 7. Except for those cases, the conclusions of the
exponential setting seem to hold in the general Weibull case.
We next analyze in more detail the intuition behind these results.
Analysis of MOG results. To understand what are the main drivers of our results, we
start by analyzing, on a sample path basis, the evolution in time of the myopic and optimal
order quantities. We measure the level of learning achieved be either policy as the distance
between the prescribed order quantity and the optimal order when θ is known. Specifically,
if we let {ymt (Dt−11 )}t=1,...,T and {y∗t (Dt−11 )}t=1,...,T denote the sequences of myopic and
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optimal orders for a particular sample path DT1 := (D1, . . . , DT ), and y(θ) := F
−1(r|θ) the


















To assess the impact that these error have in costs, we consider an alternative error measure.












that is, CostErrort represents the relative cost distance of the myopic and the optimal policies
in therms of the true expected cost given θ.
For brevity, we consider a subset of the examples given in the exponential and Weibull
cases. In particular we fix T = 50, UR = 7, and consider the ` = 1 (exponential) and
` = 7 cases for two values of r, r = 0.2 and r = 0.8. For each case we estimate the values
of MyopicErrort, OptErrort and CostErrort through montecarlo simulation. The results are
depicted in Figure 2.4.
Consider first the ` = 1 case. From the top-left picture two main conclusions can
be drawn: first, there is non-trivial learning taking place, as there is at least a twofold
reduction in MyopicErrort and OptErrort for all cases; since both policies prescribe higher
orders for r = 0.8 the learning rate is steeper in that case. Second, the learning curves of the
optimal and myopic policies quickly become indistinguishable. In other words, both policies
learn at very similar rates. This fact is reflected on the cost picture, at the bottom-left of
Figure 2.4. The cost difference actually favors the mypopic policy in the first periods (i.e.
CostErrort > 0) and then this is compensated very slowly by the optimal policy in the rest
of the time horizon. The result is a very slight overall advantage of the optimal policy: less
than a half percent point in total cost, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Consider now the case of ` = 7. Recall that in these examples UR = 7 and hence this
case corresponds to the the highest curve in the MOGwc plots at the bottom-right of Figure
2.3. These are the only cases where the MOG can become significant. In these cases the
problem primitives satisfy two conditions: (i) there is little noise associated with demand
(i.e., ` is large) and (ii) there is high uncertainty about the unknown demand parameter θ
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Figure 2.4: OptErrort, MyopicErrort and CostErrort as a function of t, for T = 50,
UR = 7 ` = 1, , 7, and r = 0.1, 0.8.
(i.e., UR is large). Suppose that we keep UR fixed, and hence the ratio between the two
sources of uncertainty in the system is constant. When ` is large, the coefficient of variation
of the demand distribution is small and hence most of the uncertainty in the system comes
from the prior distribution, that is, from the fact that θ is unknown. We are then in
a situation where, if θ were known, demand itself would be highly predictable (roughly
speaking, almost deterministic) and the demand-supply mismatch costs very low. This is
evidenced in the steepness of the learning curves in the top-right picture of Figure 2.4:
particularly in the r = 0.8 case, most of the uncertainty on the optimal order y(θ) vanishes
after a few periods under both policies. Note that, in contrast to the ` = 1 case, for r = 0.2
the learning rate of the myopic order is markedly slower then that of the optimal order. This
stems from the fact that, even though very few demand observations suffice to nearly learn
θ, the myopic censoring probability is high due to the low r and hence the optimal policy
can make a difference by ordering more at the beginning. This effect is clearly observed
in the evolution of CostErrort in the bottom-right of Figure 2.4: one can observe how the
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optimal policy incurs a substantially higher cost at the first periods (CostErrort > 10%) in
order to quickly learn θ and then this produces a substantial advantage in the following
periods, where CostErrort < 0. Overall the total cost difference, for the r = 0.2 case, is no
longer negligible, close to 10%, as shown in the bottom-right picture of Figure 2.3.
To summarize, the prior discussion shows that the MOG can indeed be significant, but
only if the problem satisfies very specific conditions: (i) there is little noise associated
with demand, (ii) there is high uncertainty about the unknown demand parameter θ and
(iii) the holding cost h is high relative to the penalty cost p. In these situation there
is a high potential gain from exploring, and hence one may not ignore the exploration-
exploitation trade-off. From a practical point of view, however, when the three conditions
above are satisfied, one faces a problem of a different nature than the typical newsvendor
problem we started with: in these cases, demand is, roughly speaking, deterministic and
can be essentially learned exactly with very few uncensored observations. Aside from these
examples, in some sense degenerate cases, the results in this section show that the MOG is
almost uniformly negligible.
2.3.4 Analysis of the Cost of Censoring
We next assess the cost of censoring, that is, the relative cost of going from an uncensored
to a censored environment. As in Section 2.3.3, we will consider the worst-case cost of
censoring COCwc over values of the time horizon 1 ≤ T ≤ 100, i.e.,
COCwc := max
1≤T≤100
V ∗T (a, 1)− V oT (a, 1)
V oT (a, 1)
. (2.17)
In Figure 2.5, we plot COCwc as a function of the uncertainty ratio UR and the service level
r, for different values of the Weibull parameter `.
Figure 2.5 shows that the overall shape and the behavior in extreme cases of the cost of
censoring is similar to that of the myopic optimality gap . The main difference between the
results in Figure 2.5 and those shown in Figure 2.3 is given by the order of magnitude of the
gaps. The COCwc appears to be at least an order of magnitude larger than the MOGwc.
8 To
8As in Section 2.3.3, one can observe that the most extreme cases are given in the lower right plot of
Figure 2.5, particularly with higher values of UR. One can apply the same reasoning as before to explain
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Figure 2.5: The worst-case cost of censoring COCwc as a function of `, r and UR.
make clearer comparison, Figure 2.6 combines the results of Figures 2.3 and 2.5 in single
plot: the red lines represent the worst case cost of censoring COCwc and the blue areas
represent the worst case myopic optimality gap MOGwc, displayed as an increment over the
cost of censoring. As we can see from the results, the MOG is not only low in absolute
terms, but also relative to the COC.
Implications. At a high level, most practitioners are well aware of censoring but rarely
fully recognize the exploration-exploitation trade-off, focusing more on attempting to record
lost sales. The comparison above is informative in the following sense. It shows that the
exploration-exploitation trade-off and the need for forward looking policies introduced by
demand censoring (with the computational complexity that might be associated with it)
is, for all practical purposes, a second order problem compared to the value that might be
the high gap values in this context: if there is high θ uncertainty and very low demand noise, an uncensored
demand observation essentially reveals future demand values, leading to a problem of a different nature.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of the worst-case cost of censoring COCwc and the worst
case myopic optimality gap MOGwc as a function of `, r and UR. The red lines
represent the COCwc and the blue areas represent the MOGwc, displayed as an increment
over the COCwc.
generated by investing in processes and technology to uncensor (even partially) demand.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In the present chapter, we study the implications of demand censoring in inventory problems,
focusing on the perishable, or newsvendor, case. From a performance point of view, we study
the overall impact of censoring on costs, and we find that, for one of the few known tractable
cases, the extra incurred cost is low. We also study how censoring affects decisions, and
in particular how the exploration-exploitation tradeoff introduced by censoring affects an
(otherwise optimal) myopic policy. We find that, for practical purposes, there is virtually
no tradeoff in this case: being myopic is essentially as good as optimal. Operationally, this
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surprising fact implies that there is no need to develop and apply optimal policies. We also
find that, even though the cost of censoring is low, it is an order of magnitude higher than
the myopic optimality gap. This means that if a decision maker faces the choice of either
investing in improving decision policies or in collecting data on lost sales, effort would be
better rewarded by focusing on the latter.
Due to analytical reasons, we focused our study on a particular family of distributions,
widely adopted in the literature. On the one hand, this restricts the scope of our conclusions.
On the other hand, this is virtually the only known tractable case of this problem. This work
is a first step towards the quantification of the fine trade-off associated with information
collection introduced by demand censoring. While challenging to formalize and establish,
we conjecture that the general conclusion that demand censoring and, more specifically, its
effects on policy decisions and subsequent performance, can be, to some extent, disregarded,
might extend beyond the Weibull demand case we studied. This is a worthwhile avenue of
future research. Indeed, it is worth noting that in more general cases with non-conjugate
families of distributions, the dynamic optimization problem becomes infinite dimensional
and obtaining an optimal policy is highly intractable. However, the myopic policy is the
easiest policy to apply in practice, and is always a viable heuristic.
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Dynamic learning in sequential
auctions
3.1 Problem Formulation
We consider an agent facing a sequence of T auctions for identical copies of a good. If the
agent wins an auction he is awarded with item and collects a reward associated with it. The
agent seeks to maximize the cumulative reward over the T auctions, and is assumed to be
risk neutral. In each auction there exists a set of competing players who bid for the item.
We summarize the information about the competing players at period t in a competing bid
b̂t that represents the maximum of their bids. We assume that b̂1, . . . , b̂T are independent
and identically distributed random variables, with support [0, b], where b ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞},
and a cdf denoted by q(·).
We denote the reward collected by the agent, if he wins the auction at period t, by Xt.
This reward should be interpreted as the benefit that the agent obtains by winning the
auction. For example, if the auctioned item is a slot for a graphical ad in a webpage, Xt
represents the revenue associated with the displayed ad. We assume that the rewards in each
auction are independent and identically distributed, belonging to a family of distributions
parametrized by an unknown parameter ν ∈ N ⊂ Rn.1 Following a Bayesian approach, we
1Following the graphical ad example above, ν could represent the (unknown) click probability of the ad.
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assume that the bidder holds a prior distribution over ν, denoted by π(·). Given ν, the cdf
and pdf of the rewards are denoted by F (·|ν) and f(·|ν) respectively. We denote by µν the
expected reward conditional on ν, that is µν :=
∫
xf(x|ν)dx, and by µ(π) the predictive




f(x|ν)π(ν)dνdx. Unless otherwise stated, in
the rest of this chapter the expectation Eπ[·] is taken with respect to ({Xt}, ν, {b̂t}), where
ν has pdf π(·), Xt has (conditional) cdf F (·|ν) and b̂t has cdf q(·). For simplicity, in some
cases we will denote by X and b̂ generic versions of the reward and competing bid, equally
distributed to Xt and b̂t respectively.
For simplicity, we further assume that the agent is facing second price auctions. This
assumption is not critical for our results, but it facilitates exposition. In section 3.2.2 we
detail how our framework can be adapted to a more general setting. According to a second









Note that we do not model explicitly a reserve price in the structure of the auction, but
such reserve price may be encoded in b̂.
The bidder only observes (and collects) rewards if he wins the auction. We denote by
Ft the filtration generated by the partially observed reward process, that is
Ft :=
{
(b1, I{b1≥b̂1}X1), . . . , (bt−1, I{b1≥b̂t−1}Xt−1)
}
.






< ∞, for all
t = 1, . . . , T and any b ∈ [0, b]. We denote by P the set of Ft-measurable policies for
all t ≥ 1. The objective is to maximize the cumulative expected reward. The optimal value
is given by











where the expectation is taken assuming that decisions are made according to the policy β.
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3.1.1 Dynamic Programming Formulation and Myopic Value
The value function defined in (3.1) can be alternatively written using Bellman’s equation
as follows:












+ (1− q(b))V ∗T−1(π), (3.2)
with boundary conditions V ∗0 (π) := 0 for all π. Here π ⊕X represents the updated beliefs
after observing the reward X, that is
π ⊕X(ν) := π(ν)f(X|ν)∫
π(ν̃)f(X|ν̃)dν̃ .
The first term in equation (3.2) represents the present value of placing a bid b, while the
second and third terms represent the future value of bidding b, purely associated to the
learning component of the problem. That is, a bid that is optimal in terms of today’s
rewards might not be optimal if one takes into account future rewards. This represents the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff in this problem. It is not hard to prove in this case that,
in a multiperiod problem, it is always optimal to bid more than what one would in a single












where p(b) := Eπ[ b̂ I{b̂≤b}] represents the expected payments if the agent places a bid of
b. Note that, because this is a second price auction, the agent’s optimal strategy is to bid
his own expected reward. That is, the bid that maximizes (3.3) is given by bm = µ(π). We
call this bid the myopic bid, as it represents the optimal action for an agent facing a single
period auction. The following lemma shows that, in a multiperiod problem, it is always
optimal to bid higher than the myopic bid.2
Lemma 3.1. Let b∗(π, T ) be the optimal bid in (3.2). For any prior distribution π and any
T ,
b∗(π, T ) ≥ µ(π).
2Similar version of this lemma have been proven in [Li et al., 2010] and [Iyer et al., 2014].
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equals 0 at b = µ(π) and q′(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [0, b], it suffices
to show that
Eπ[V ∗T−1(π ⊕X)]− V ∗T−1(π) ≥ 0.
We proceed by induction. The case T−1 = 0 is trivial, since both terms equal 0. Suppose
now that the result is true for T −1. Consider now V ∗T (π ⊕ X) and suppose one picks
b := b∗(π, T ) as a bid. Clearly the reward is worse than the optimal value, that is,
V ∗T (π ⊕X) ≥ Eπ⊕X [I{b∗(π,T )≥b̂}
(
X ′ − b̂
)
] + q(b∗(π, T ))Eπ⊕X
[
V ∗T−1(π ⊕X ⊕X ′)
]
+ (1− q(b∗(π, T )))V ∗T−1(π ⊕X),
where X ′ is a random variable iid to X. Note that, because of the tower property of

















Eπ[V ∗T (π ⊕X)]− V ∗T (π) ≥ q(b∗(π, T ))Eπ
[
V ∗T−1(π ⊕X ⊕X ′)− V ∗T−1(π ⊕X)
]
+
(1− q(b∗(π, T )))Eπ
[
V ∗T−1(π ⊕X)− V ∗T−1(π)
]
.
By the induction hypothesis both terms inside the expectations are nonnegative and there-
fore the result is proven.
Let us now formally define the myopic value function, which results from placing the
myopic bid on every auction, given the current information:




+ (1− q(µ(π)))V mT−1(π), (3.4)
with boundary conditions V m0 (π) := 0 for all π.
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3.1.2 An information relaxation bound
Because the optimal policy is hard to characterize analytically, we will rely on an infor-
mation relaxation bound to make the analysis more tractable. We consider an alternative
informational system, where the agent always observes the reward X, regardless of whether
he wins the auction or not. We call this the full observation system. The filtration generated
by this process is given by
Fot := {(b1, X1), . . . , (bt−1, Xt−1)} .
Note that in this case decisions and information collection are independent and hence the
optimal policy is to play myopically in every period. Let V oT (π) denote the optimal value
function in the full observation system, which can be defined using Bellman’s equation as






+ Eπ[V oT−1(π ⊕X)].
Note that, because the myopic policy is an admissible policy in the problem defined in (3.1)
and Ft ⊂ Fot , one can conclude that
V mT (π) ≤ V ∗T (π) ≤ V oT (π).
In particular, this implies that
V ∗T (π)− V mT (π) ≤ V oT (π)− V mT (π). (3.5)
3.2 Main Results
Lemma 3.1 shows that in this problem the exploration always occurs in one direction: it
is always optimal to bid more in order to collect more information for the future. Note,
however, that even by playing myopically and ignoring the learning component of the de-
cision the bidder still implicitly learns, if the probability of winning remains high enough.
This raises the question of to what extent, or in which cases, the exploration-exploitation
trade-off matters.
There are, nevertheless, situations where the myopic policy is indeed expected to perform
poorly. In particular, when the distributions of ν and the competing bid b̂ define a region in
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Figure 3.1: Example of prior and competing bid distributions where the myopic
policy produces zero rewards, but there exist potential gains from overbidding.
Because µ(π) < b̂, the myopic policy loses all auctions and obtains 0 rewards, but there are
potential gains from overbidding to learn if the true valuation lies above b̂, which occurs
with probability equal to the shaded area.
the bid space where the myopic policy can get “stuck”, that is, a region with zero probability
of (myopically) winning an auction. For example, consider an auction where the competing
bid is deterministic, but the agent’s expected reward is unknown. If the current (predictive)
expected reward µ(π) lies below the competing bid, the myopic policy will lose every auction
and its cumulative reward will be 0. Note however that, because of the uncertainty around
ν, there is potential incentive to bid higher than the myopic bid µ(π). This situation
is depicted in Figure 3.1 (for simplicity we assume that E[X|ν] = ν). The shaded area
represents the probability of ν belonging to a region where the bidder would profit from the
auctions. Though extreme, since it is unlikely that the competing bid be deterministic and
known, this example illustrates the disadvantage of playing myopically when the current
expected reward has a low winning probability, but there is still high uncertainty around
its true value. In those cases the myopic policy essentially stops learning and the potential
gain from exploration grows.
The example of Figure 3.1 illustrates situations where the myopic policy performs poorly.
In Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 below we develop bounds that help characterize cases
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where being myopic indeed produces good results. In particular, we develop a bound on
the difference between the myopic value and the full observation value, V o − V m, which in
turn serves as an upper bound on V m − V ∗, as shown in (3.5).
Theorem 3.1. Let Xt1 := (X1, . . . , Xt), π
o
t := π ⊕ X1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Xt and Varν̃∼π(µν̃) denote
the variance of µν̃ , when ν̃ has a pdf π. Suppose that q(·) has a bounded first derivative.
Then there exists K > 0 such that for any T and prior distribution π,










Proof. We start by defining some additional notation. Unless otherwise stated, in this proof

























the expected single auction value when ν is known by the agent. Let us also define
ΓT (π) := E[V mT (π ⊕X)]− V mT (π)
as the (myopic) value of a reward observation.
We have
V oT (π)− V mT (π)
= E[V oT−1(π ⊕X)]− q(µ(π))E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)]− (1− q(µ(π)))V mT−1(π)
= E[VT−1(π ⊕X)]− E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)] + (1− q(µ(π)))
[
E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)]− V mT−1(π)
]















where πot := π⊕X1⊕ . . .⊕Xt and the last inequality comes from Lemma B.1 in Appendix
B. We now aim to bound the summand in (3.7). Recall from (3.3) and (3.6) that Q(πot ) =
max
b
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Consider the Taylor expansion of g(·) at µ(πot ) and note that, due to the envelope theorem,
g′(z) = q(z). Thus, we have
g(µν̃)− g(µ(πot )) = q(µ(πot ))(µν̃ − µ(πot )) +
1
2
q′(ξ)(µν̃ − µ(πot ))2
≤ q(µ(πot ))(µν̃ − µ(πot )) +K(µν̃ − µ(πot ))2, (3.9)


















πot (ν̃)dν̃ ≤ K
∫
(µν̃ − µ(π))2πot (ν̃)dν̃ := K Varν̃∼πot (ν̃),




t (ν̃)dν̃ =: Eν̃∼πot [E[X|ν̃]]. By
combining this with (3.8) the result is proven.
The numerator in the expectation of Theorem 3.1
[
1 − q(µ(πot ))
]
Varν̃∼πot (µν̃) can be
interpreted as the losses due to the fact that the agent only observes a fraction of the reward
realizations: 1− q(µ(πot )) represents the fraction of lost auctions when playing myopic and
the posterior variance Varν̃∼πot (µν̃) the estimation error associated with the missed reward
observations. The denominator q(µ(πot )) can be associated with the fact that when the
probability of winning an auction is low, the myopic loss grows.
The posterior variance shrinks as t grows and the uncertainty around ν, and µν , is
reduced. The denominator q(µ(πot )), on the other hand, becomes closer to q(µν), as µ(π
o
t )→
µν , and could render the expectation unbounded if 1/q(µν) is not integrable. This is the
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case of the example of Figure 3.1. In that example, the expectations in Theorem 3.1 are
equal to infinity for every t. In order to avoid this type of situations, more restrictions are
needed on the competing bid and reward distributions. In Corollary 3.1 we make mild extra
assumptions to ensure that the bound in Theorem 3.1 is finite, and we show that under
these assumptions the myopic loss growths only at a logarithmic rate in time, and shrinks
as the prior uncertainty is reduced at a rate proportional to the prior variance.
Corollary 3.1. Let πok := π ⊕ X1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Xk. Suppose the assumptions in Theorem 3.1
hold and that 1/q(x) = O(φ(x)) as x → 0, where φ(·) is a convex function such that
Eπ[φ(µν)] :=
∫
φ(µν)π(ν)dν <∞. If Varν∼πok(µν) = O(1/k) as k →∞ almost surely, then
a)
V oT (π)− V mT (π) = O(log(T )) as T →∞.
b)
Eπ [V oT (πok)− V mT (πok)] = O(1/k) as k →∞.





















where the first inequality comes from (3.10) and the fact that 1/q(·) = O(φ(·)), the second
inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality, and the last equality from the law of iterated
























with a constant independent from t, which proves b).
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Part a) of Corollary 3.1 shows that the myopic loss grows at most logarithmically with
the size of the time horizon. Part b) shows that the rate at which the myopic loss is
reduced as the original uncertainty around ν decreases is proportional to the prior variance.
Corollary 3.1 requires that 1/q(µν) is bounded by an integrable function near 0, which
is equivalent to requiring that E[1/q(µν)] < ∞, precluding situations like that of Figure
3.1. This is a necessary condition for the summand in Theorem 3.1 to be finite; by further
requiring convexity of φ(·) it becomes sufficient as well. The convergence rate of the posterior
variance 1/k is inspired on a frequentist approach: 1/k is the rate of convergence of the
variance of the sample average for independent observations. In a Bayesian setting it is
harder to ensure in general that 1/k is indeed the rate of convergence of the posterior
variance, but is readily verifiable for many common distribution families.
Though not true in general, it is possible to verify that 1/q(·) is itself convex, if q(·)
is the cdf of common families of distributions, such as Normal or Gamma. In particular,
if 1/q(·) is polynomically bounded near 0, i.e. 1/q(x) = O(x−α) for some α ∈ R, then
the convexity condition in Corollary 3.1 is satisfied. This case is particularly relevant
to our problem because q(·) is defined as the cdf of the competing bid in the auction.
Suppose the auction is composed of j bidders indexed by i = 0, . . . , j−1, where i = 0
is the index of the agent. Let us denote by b̂i the bid of bidder i, and assume that the
bids are independent and identically distributed, with cdf denoted by G(·). In this case,
q(x) := P{maxi=1...j−1 b̂i ≤ x} = Gj−1(x). Thus, if 1/G(·) is polynomically bounded, then
so is 1/q(·). Therefore, q(·) such that 1/q(x) = O(x−α) represents a natural choice when
applying Corollary 1 to concrete examples. We next present two cases where we apply it for
well known families of reward distributions, with polynomically bounded competing bids.
Example 3.1: Beta-Bernoulli rewards and competing bids. Suppose the reward,
conditional on ν, is distributed as X|ν ∼Bernoulli(ν) and ν ∼Beta(s1, s2). This can be
interpreted as follows: the agent bids for an ad with an uncertain click-through-rate (or
click probability) represented by ν; if a user clicks on the ad the advertiser obtains a fixed
profit, normalized to 1. The Beta-Bernoulli example has been repeatedly adopted in the
literature (in online advertising and in other areas of application - see for example [Li et
al., 2010] or [Hummel and McAfee, 2014]-), mainly for tractability purposes. Under this
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assumptions, µν = ν, E[ν] = s1/(s1 + s2) and Var(ν) = E[ν](1− E[ν])/(s1 + s2 + 1). After
observing X1, . . . , Xt the Bayesian updates are given by













s1 + s2 + t
,
Varν∼πot (µν) =
µ(πot )(1− µ(πot ))
s1 + s2 + t
≤ 1
s1 + s2 + t
= O(1/t).
Suppose that the competing bidders’ rewards are also Beta-Bernoulli distributed. If we
further assume that they play myopically with respect to their beliefs, the competing bid
distribution will be given by q(x) := Gj−1(x), where G(·) is a the cdf of a Beta distribution.
It is not to hard to show, using elementary calculus, that 1/G(·) is polynomically bounded




for some α ∈ R. Let us further assume that s1 > α and note














Therefore, if s1 > α, π(·) and q(·) in this example satisfy the conditions of Corollary 3.1,
which implies
V oT (π)− V mT (π) = O(log(T )), and
E [V oT (πok)− V mT (πok)] = O(1/k).
Example 3.2: Gamma-Weibull rewards with polynomically bounded competing
bid distribution. Suppose X|ν∼Weibull(ν, `), and ν∼Gamma(a, S), where ` is known.
This implies that µν ∝ 1/ν, E[µν ] ∝ S/(a − 1) and Var(µν) ∝ E[µν ]2/(a − 2), for a > 2,
where the proportionality symbol denotes that the quantity is multiplied by some function
of ` only. The prior and likelihood distributions are given by




f(x|ν, `) := ν`x`−1 exp{−νx`}.
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After t observations X1, . . . , Xt, the Bayesian updates are given by
















a+ t− 2 .
In principle it is not possible to bound Varν∼πot (µν), as µ(π
o
t ) is an unbounded random






a+ t− 2 ,
by simply decreasing the value of α by two we can proceed as if Varν∼πot (µν) = O(1/t).
Next, note that





<∞, if a+ α > 2
and hence, we can apply Corollary 3.1 to conclude that
V oT (π)− V mT (π) = O(log(T )), and
E [V oT (πok)− V mT (πok)] = O(1/k).
3.2.1 Decoupling rewards: Learning click rate and user value
Our development so far, and the two examples presented above, are based on the premise
that there is a reward associated with winning the auction, which we denote by X. In
a pay-per-impression online auction environment this is equivalent to assuming that the
reward is associated with the impression of an ad, whereas, in reality, advertisers benefit
only if the user clicks on it. One can embed this feature to our model by aggregating the
3Similarly to Example 3.1 it is not hard to show that µν = 1/ν ∼InverseGamma(a, 1/S) has a polynom-
ically bounded cdf and hence in this case also, if the competing bidders have the same prior as the agent
and they bid myopically, there exists α such that 1/q(x) = O(x−α).
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click event and the reward collected from a user in a single random variable. By letting
X := εY , where ε ∈ {0, 1} is the click event and Y ≥ 0 is the value of a visiting user, one
can apply our model and results so far without changes.
However, with this approach one is implicitly assuming that what the agent observes
upon winning an auction is his compound reward X, and in principle he is unable to
distinguish a user that did not click the ad from one that clicked on it, but produced no
revenue; both events signal X = 0. In practice, however, advertisers can observe whether
a user clicks on a displayed ad or not, and they can separately estimate what is the value
associated with a visitor.
We propose an extension to our model that, with mild modifications, can account for the
fact that click rates and user value can be estimated separately. Essentially, one needs to
decouple the reward associated with an ad impression from the feedback that the advertiser
gets by winning the auction. Consider again the formulation of our model in Section 3.1,
and suppose that Xt represents what the agent observes when he wins the auction, and let
R(Xt) be the reward associated with this observation. In the online advertising setting one








Note that the information collection process is unchanged with respect to the original for-
mulation, except that now X and ν are (potentially) multidimensional random variables.
Therefore, the expression for the optimal and myopic value functions are identical to (3.1),
(3.2) and (3.4), except for the single period reward, which is replaced by the expression
above. If we further denote
µν := E[R(X)|ν]
µ(π) := E[R(X)],
the statement and the proof of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 are also unchanged.
We now illustrate with an example how this extension can be used to model a more
realistic online advertising setting, as discussed above.
Example 3.3: Beta-Bernoulli click rate with Exponential user value. Let ε ∈
{0, 1} denote the event of a user clicking on a displayed ad, and let νε := P{ε = 1} ,
53
CHAPTER 3. DYNAMIC LEARNING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
where νε∼Beta(s1, s2). Let us denote by Y the value associated with a user that clicked
on the ad, and assume that Y ∼Exponential(νY ), with νY ∼Gamma(a,S). We then define
ν := (νε, νY ), X := (ε, εY ) and R(ε, Y ) := εY . Assuming that the click event and the user
value distributions are independent one can write
µν := E[R(X)|ν] = νε ν−1Y





Note that now π(ν) is a bi-dimensional parameter distribution, with hyperparameters
(s1, s2, a, S). After observing X1 = (ε1, ε1Y1), . . . , Xt = (εt, εtYt), the updates are given
by
















Because in this case it is not possible to show that the posterior variance is O(1/t) for any
realization of X1, . . . , Xt, we cannot apply Corollary 3.1 directly. One can, however, apply
similar arguments to arrive to the same conclusion: if the competing bid q(·) is such that
1/q(x) = O(x−α), with a+ α > 2 and s1 > α+ 1, then
EXt1
[
q−1(µ(πot )) Varν̂∼πot (µν̂)
]
= O(1/t).
This is shown in Lemma B.2 in Appendix B. We thus have shown that for this case also,
V oT (π)− V mT (π) = O(log(T )), and
E [V oT (πok)− V mT (πok)] = O(1/k).
3.2.2 First price auctions
So far we have studied our problem in the framework of second price auctions, where the
optimal (myopic) bid is given by the current expected reward of the agent. Our approach,
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however, can be extended to account for other types of auctions. In particular, with mild




X − ψ(b, b̂)
)
,
where ψ(b, b̂) are the payments of the agent, for a bidding profile (b, b̂). Here ψ(b, b̂) := b̂
would define a second price auction and ψ(b, b̂) := b a first price one. A myopic bidder












where, as before, µ(π) := E[X], and p(b) is now more generally defined as E[I{b≥b̂}ψ(b, b̂)].
We denote by bm(µ(π)) the (myopic) optimal bid that solves the problem above. Note that
the structure of the single period auction is very similar to the one defined in (3.3), except
that now the mypoic bid as a function of µ(π) is no longer defined as bm(µ(π)) := µ(π).
All the results and examples of sections 3.1 and 3.2 (which, for the purpose of brevity,
we will not restate and prove here) follow directly from replacing the optimal myopic bid by
bm(µ(π)) and the myopic probability of winning q(µ(π)) by q(bm(µ(π))). The assumptions
in Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 are now stated with respect to the function q ◦ bm(·),
rather than q(·).
Consider now the case of a first price auction, where bm(µ(π)) is defined as the solution
to the following equation on b:
q′(b)(µ(π)− b) = q(b).
Note that the definition of bm(·) is now dependent on q(·) and might not lead to a closed form
in general. However, one can still apply Corollary 3.1 as in the examples of this chapter, by
simply assuming a slightly stronger condition on q(·). In Lemma B.3 in Appendix B we show
that, if q′(x) = Θ(xα−1) as x→ 0 for some α ∈ R, then 1/q ◦ bm(x) = O(x−α).4 Therefore,
we can replicate the arguments of Examples 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and reach the conclusion that,
for first price auctions as well, the myopic loss grows at most logarithmically in time and
decreases at rate 1/k if the prior variance decreases at that rate.
4A function g(x) = Θ(ϕ(x)) as x → a if C2ϕ(x) ≤ g(x) ≤ C1ϕ(x) for all x in a neighborhood of a and
some fixed constants C1 and C2.
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3.3 Numerical Examples
In this section we perform numerical experiments to evaluate the myopic performance and
compare it to that of the optimal policy. For computational reasons, we focus on sec-
ond price auctions with Beta-Bernoulli distributions, as in Example 3.1. That is, we let
X∼Bernoulli(ν), with ν∼Beta(s1, s2). We consider a competing bid b̂ defined as the max-
imum of k − 1 iid competing bids, each of which is distributed according to a Beta(ŝ1, ŝ2)
distribution. The competing bid cdf is thus given by q(x) := Gk−1(x), where G is the cdf
of a Beta(ŝ1, ŝ2) distribution.
We consider three scenarios for the competing bid distribution: (ŝ1, ŝ2) = (1, 3), (ŝ1, ŝ2) =
(2, 2) and (ŝ1, ŝ2) = (3, 1), and three auction sizes: k = 3, k = 4 and k = 5. We focus on
cases that satisfy the conditions of Corollary 3.1, which in this setting translates into re-
quiring that s1 > α := (k − 1) ŝ1. In each case, we let (s1, s2) := (k ŝ1, k ŝ2), implying that
E[ν] = E[̂bi], where b̂i represents the bid of an individual competing bidder. This means
that the agent’s myopic bid in the first auction is equal to the myopic bid of the competing
players.
For each combination of ŝ := (ŝ1, ŝ2) and k we compute the myopic optimality gap
(MOG), defined as (V ∗T − V mT )/V mT , as a function of the time horizon T . The results are
depicted in figure 3.3. The plots on the left side of Figure 3.3 show the MOG values for the
different experiments, while the right side plots depict the corresponding cumulative distri-
bution functions of the prior distribution and the competing bid, Π(·) and q(·), respectively.
The results show that the myopic optimality gap is low in most examples, and it grows as
the number of players in the auction increases: for larger k, the competing bid distributions
(stochastically) grows, and the winning probability under the myopic policy diminishes, as
shown in the CDFs plots. Similarly, for fixed k, the worst case is given by (ŝ1, ŝ2) = (3, 1).
Even though in this case the starting mean reward of the agent is higher, so is the mean
reward of the competitors and as a result the winning probability decreases.
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Figure 3.2: Numerical examples results. On the left, the myopic optimality gaps as a
function of T for different distributional settings. On the right, the corresponding cumula-
tive distribution functions.
57
CHAPTER 3. DYNAMIC LEARNING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In the present chapter, we study the implications of incomplete private information in se-
quential auctions. We analyze the problem from an agent’s perspective, seeking to maximize
his rewards as he learns his own valuation of the auctioned item.
We study the exploration-exploitation trade-off in this problem an find that, even though
in general terms it cannot be ignored, there exists a wide range of problem settings where
bidding myopically with respect to information collection produces near optimal results. We
characterize conditions under which this is indeed the case, and we are able to show that
the myopic optimality gap decreases at a fast rate as the length of the time horizon grows
and as the initial uncertainty on the item valuation is reduced. Our results are developed
in a general framework that includes both first-price and second price auctions, and well






We consider the stock evolution of a product sold by a retailer, consumed by customers
arriving to the store, and periodically replenished by a supplier. The retailer does not track
the available inventory of the product, except for potential periodic inspections, which are
assumed to be infrequent. We assume that the retailer can reliably record sales of the
product in a database (with, for example, a bar-code scanner in the cash register). We
also assume that the data contains, or can be used to generate, non-purchase events, that
is, events where a customer arrived to the store but left without purchasing the product
(though it is not known whether this is due to a stockout of the product or the customer
simply deciding not to purchase it). In Section 4.1.2 we explain in more detail how to extract
non-purchase events from transactional data. The input data can then be summarized as a
discrete sequence of transaction events: purchases and non-purchases of the product under
consideration.
We model the stock evolution of the product as a finite state, discrete time hidden
Markov chain, with a finite time horizon of T + 1 periods. Each state of the chain repre-
sents a stock level, with 0 representing the out of stock state, and S the maximum stock.
The transitions in the chain correspond to events in the stock evolution: purchases make the
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chain transition downwards and replenishments make the chain transition upwards. Every
time there is a transition, the system reveals whether it corresponds to a purchase trans-
action event or a non-purchase transaction. The sequence of transaction events is denoted
by d = (d1, . . . , dT ) ∈ {0,1}T , where purchases are denoted by 1, and non-purchases by 0.
For expository purposes, in what follows we consider d as the only available data for the
estimation, and in Section 4.2.2 we explain how the model can be modified to incorporate
direct inventory information. The sequence of (hidden) states of the chain is denoted by
h = (h0, h1, . . . , hT ).
We denote by Q ∈ RS+1,S+1 the transition matrix of the chain, and by E ∈ RS+1,S+1,2
the emission matrix of the system, which defines the probability of emitting 0 or 1 for each
transition. That is,
Qi,j := P {ht+1 = j | ht = i} ,
Ei,j,k := P {dt = k | ht−1 = i, ht = j} .
The structure of Q and E can have a deep impact in the quality of the estimation, and
the usefulness of the method in general. This is particularly relevant in a case where one
only has access to a very limited amount of information, and there are potentially numerous
underlying sets of parameters that can explain the data. In the next section, we define the
parameters that govern the inventory evolution of our model, and how Q and E can be
constructed as a function of them.
4.1.1 Construction of the transition and emission matrices
We denote by θ the probability that a customer arriving to the store purchases an item,
when there is availability. For simplicity, we assume that every customer can purchase at
most one unit of the product under consideration, though our model can be extended to
account for multiple item purchases, if that information is available in the data. The sup-
plier visits the store periodically to replenish the stock of the product. In order to make
the estimation procedure more efficient (i.e. preserve the conjugate property of the param-
eters prior distribution) we further assume that the probability of having a purchase and a
replenishment simultaneously is negligible, and hence replenishments always correspond to
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non-purchase events.1 There is a fixed probability of a supplier arrival at each non-purchase
event, denoted by µ. Figure 4.1 depicts an example of the hidden Markov chain, with tran-
sition matrix Q constructed as a function of θ and µ. In this case, every transition emits













Figure 4.1: Example of the hidden Markov chain (self transition of state S−1 is omitted
for display purposes).
in the out of stock state (ht = 0) purchase events are not observable and, similarly, in the
maximum stock state (ht = S) replenishments are not observable.
Record inaccuracies: One issue with the Markov chain defined in Figure 4.1 is that
downward transitions are potentially too restrictive: the stock goes down if and only if
the system records a purchase of the product. If the assumptions made so far are a good
approximation to the process that generates the data, this would not necessarily represent
a problem. In practice, however, one would expect both complex inventory dynamics and
1In most applications, non-purchase events are substantially more common than purchase events and
hence this represents a mild assumption.
61
CHAPTER 4. ESTIMATING INACCURATE INVENTORY WITH TRANSACTIONAL
DATA
record inaccuracies, and hence such a restrictive condition enforced on the model can lead
to poor estimations results. To see why this might be the case, consider, as an example, the
case where the system records an unusually long sequence of non-purchases; this could be
due to a delay on the supplier side, an unexpected increase in demand, failure to retrieve
items from a warehouse, or any other circumstantial cause. In such a case, one would expect
the method to categorize the state of the system as being effectively out of stock. However,
conditional on observing a long sequence of 0’s, and based on the hidden Markov chain
defined in Figure 4.1, the procedure will infer that the system is eventually in a high level
of stock, because no purchase were recorded, and a replenishment is likely to arrive at some
point.
We propose a simple way to address this issue, and at the same time make the model
more flexible and robust to noise in the data. In particular, we allow for a fraction of the
purchases not to be observed by the system, that is, to be recorded as non-purchases. We
do this by defining a new parameter ε that represents the probability of the system correctly
recording a purchase. In other words, when there is a purchase, there is a probability 1− ε
that it will be missclassified as a non-purchase. With this in mind, the emission matrix E
is defined as
Ei,i−1,1 = ε , for i = 1, . . . , S
Ei,i−1,0 = 1− ε , for i = 1, . . . , S
Ei,j,k = 0 , otherwise.
Beside making the model more flexible, the inclusion of ε as a parameter has a concrete
interpretation: it represents the fraction of unregistered or “invisible” demand in the system.
This is tightly related to the literature on inaccurate stock optimization, where the rate of
invisible demand is assumed to be known. The estimation procedure can then also be
regarded as a way to generate the input parameters of an inaccurate inventory optimizer.
Restocking quantity uncertainty: In the example shown in Figure 4.1 all the replenishes
increase the stock to its maximum value of S units, which is assumed to be known. In
practice, it is likely that there exist some level of uncertainty about either the value of
the maximum stock S, or the quantity that is added to the stock when a replenishment
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occurs. We incorporate these sources of uncertainty in our model in the following manner:
we assume that, conditional on a replenishment occurring, the new stock level is drawn
independently from an unknown distribution, to be estimated by the procedure. More
precisely, let us denote by µ the minimum possible restocking value, and
µi := P{ht = i | ht−1 < µ and a replenishment occurs},
for i = µ, . . . , S.
We assume that restocking events strictly increase the inventory level.2 The restocking
probabilities for every state of the chain can then be written as




µk if i < µ ≤ k
µk
µi+1 + . . .+ µS
if k > i ≥ µ
0 otherwise.
The second line above states that the probability of restocking to k, when the inventory
level is above µ, is the conditional probability of restocking to k, given that restockings are
always strictly incremental.
The inclusion of {µi} gives the estimation procedure the capability of resolving potential
uncertainty regarding the maximum stock level or the replenishment policy, very likely to
exist in practice. Consider, for example, a case where one is uncertain about the value
of S. Suppose, however, that it is possible to guess a reasonable range where S is likely
to be, that is, S ∈
[
S, . . . , S
]
. Then, by setting S := S and µ := S, the procedure will
estimate the actual value of S using the available data. It is also possible that there is some
inherent noise in the replenishment process, and hence there is no true restocking value
to be estimated. In such a case, the output values of {µi} will reflect this, by defining a
restocking distribution.
Figure 4.2 (partially) depicts the hidden Markov chain with invisible sale transactions and
2This assumption is inconsistent with some common inventory policies, such us the well known (s, S)
policy. The reason to enforce this restriction is simplicity and computational efficiency, as discussed in
Section 4.2.1.
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(1− µ)(1− θ) if 0 < i < S j = i
(1− µ)θ if 0 < i < S j = i− 1
µµj if 0 ≤ i < µ j ≥ µ
µ
µj
µi+1 + . . .+ µS
if µ ≤ i < S j ≥ i+ 1
1− µ if i = 0 j = 0
θ if i = S j = S − 1
1− θ if i = S j = S
0 otherwise

































ε Probability of the system correctly recording a sale.
µ Probability of supplier arrival (replenishment).
{µi}i=µ,...,S Distribution of replenishment quantities.
Table 4.1: Parameters of the model.
4.1.2 Defining non-purchase events
We now turn our attention to the definition of non-purchase events. Non-purchase events
should be broadly interpreted as a measure of time between purchases of the product: a long
sequence of 0’s represents a long period of time where no purchase was recorded, and hence
a signal that the product might be out of stock. There is more than one way of defining
non-purchase events, depending on the available data. If, for example, the data contains
purchases of the product with timestamps, under some mild assumptions the non-purchases
can be randomly generated as a function of the inter-purchase time. We propose a simpler
approach, based on aggregate store purchases, which is easy to implement in practice and
robust with respect to demand fluctuations and trends.
It is reasonable to assume that a system which records a retailer’s sales does so for most
products in the store. Our approach regarding non-purchase events is to define them as
the aggregate purchases of the store, excluding those of the product under consideration.
That is, the purchase events (1) are defined as the purchases of the product, and the non-
purchase events (0) are defined as the purchases of other products in the store. The rationale
is that the purchase probability θ can be interpreted as the fraction of the customers of the
store that want the product under consideration. Note that, even though we are assuming
that this fraction remains constant in time, the demand rate itself is not assumed to be
constant. That is, demand can be subject to any type of trend or seasonal effects and
the estimation methodology will produce equally effective predictions. Formally speaking,
we are assuming that aggregate demand follows a Poisson process with an arbitrary rate
function λ(t), and hence demand for the product under consideration follows a Poisson
process with rate θλ(t). By looking only at transaction events, the method can estimate
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the parameters of the model regardless of the definition of λ(t). This is an effective way
of decoupling the demand estimation process into two steps, which can be approached
separately: the aggregate demand estimation step and the product level estimation step.
The aggregate demand estimation step (the estimation of λ(t)) can be performed with
traditional estimation techniques, such us time series analysis or smoothing. At this level,
using POS data can be a good approximation to demand, since aggregate demand is less
likely to be affected by the stock level of individual products. The product level estimation
step, the focus of our work, requires more careful analysis because sales and demand can
no longer be regarded as equivalent. It is important to note, however, that the aggregate
demand estimation is not required for our proposed estimation methodology to be carried
out. Moreover, the output of the estimation at a product level can be applied in practice
as a prediction methodology without the need of the aggregate demand parameters. To
see how, first note that once the sequences of 1 events (purchases of the product) and 0
events (purchases of other products) are defined, the method can jointly estimate both the
historical (unobservable) stock levels and the parameters of the model. Once this estimation
is performed, with data up to the time of the execution, the practitioner can use the current
estimated stock distribution of the product and the parameters of the model to build a
(probabilistic) path of the stock evolution as new events are observed. However, note that
this path depends on the sequence of 0’s and 1’s only, and not on the actual timing of these
events. If, for example, the system observes a large number of contiguous 0’s, it will likely
predict the item to be out of stock, regardless of when those non-purchases were recorded.
In this way, the retailer can have an effective way of tracking stock levels in time, without
the need of actual time information, by simply observing the sales of the store.
4.2 Estimation Methodology
We propose a Bayesian estimation method, based on the well known Markov Chain Mon-
tecarlo family of estimation algorithms. In a Bayesian setting, the parameters of the model
are regarded as random variables, endowed with a prior distribution that summarizes the
initial uncertainty that exists around them. The output of the estimation is given by the
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posterior distribution of the parameters, conditional on the observed data. We propose a
Gibbs Sampling method to perform the estimation.
As opposed to traditional non-Bayesian estimation methodologies, such as maximum
likelihood, the output of the Gibbs Sampler is not a set of definite estimates but rather a
sample from a posterior (output) distribution. By computing particular statistics of the
posterior sample, such as the sample mean or mode, one can obtain concrete estimators
for the parameters of the model. Similarly, by computing dispersion statistics, such as
the sample variance of the posterior distribution, one con measure the accuracy of such
estimators.
Figure 4.3 describes the Gibbs Sampler. The method works by alternatively sampling
from the hidden states of the Markov chain, given the observed data and the current pa-
rameters, and from the model parameters, given a sample path of the chain and the data.
This is described by steps 1 and 2 in the loop of Figure 4.3. The samples generated by the
Gibbs Sampler form a Markov Chain, whose stationary distribution can be shown to be
the desired posterior distribution of the parameters, given the observed data. It can also
be shown that, under mild conditions, the chain converges to its stationary distribution,
though it is commonly hard to bound the number of steps needed to guarantee the mixing.
In practice, most applications simply rely on a burnout period, where the first samples are
discarded. In our numerical examples we will follow this approach.
• Input: d ∈ {0,1}T
• Initialization:
Set arbitrary (θ, ε, µ, {µi})1 ∈ (0, 1)S−µ+4
• Loop: for n = 1, . . . , N
1. Sample hn ∼ p (h |(θ, ε, µ, {µi})n, d)
2. Sample (θ, ε, µ, {µi})n+1 ∼ p (θ, ε, µ, {µi} |hn, d).
• Output: {hn}, {(θ, ε, µ, {µi})n}
Figure 4.3: Gibbs Sampling Method.
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4.2.1 Posterior sampling
We now turn our attention to the sampling step of the Gibbs Sampler, and describe in more
detail steps 1 and 2 of the loop in Figure 4.3. We start by describing step 2: sampling from
the posterior distribution of the model parameters.
Posterior sampling of parameters. The main input to this step is the prior distribu-
tion of the parameters. In particular, we define the joint prior distribution as S − µ + 4
independent Uniform(0,1) distributions. That is,
p(θ, ε, µ, {µi}) := I{(0,1)S−µ+4},
where p(·) denotes the prior distribution, and I{·} denotes the indicator function.
The choice of uniform priors, a common one in the Bayesian HMM literature, reflects
maximum initial uncertainty about the model parameters. It also provides a good choice
from a computational efficiency point of view. Note that step 2 in the loop of Figure 4.3
requires sampling from the posterior distribution of (θ, ε, µ, {µi}) conditional on a sample
path hn. This greatly simplifies the sampling process: if the chain is observable, and
because of the Markovian property, every visit to a particular state provides and independent
realization of the event of the chain “choosing” one outwards transition over the others. To
illustrate how this fact facilitates the computation of the posteriors consider, for example,
the purchase events. Let x be the number of times that the chain visited a state where a
purchase is observable (i.e. non-zero stock levels), and y the number of observed purchases.
That is,
x := |{t : ht > 0}|,
y := |{t : ht+1 = ht − 1}|.
The likelihood of the observed transitions is given by
p(h|θ) = θy(1− θ)x−y,
and hence the posterior distribution of θ is given by






∼ Beta(1 + y, 1 + x− y).
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This implies that, if the path of the chain is observable, the posterior distribution of θ
belongs to a known family of distributions, and is easy to sample from3. A similar approach
can be used to calculate the posterior distribution of the rest of the parameters. However,
in order to preserve their conjugate structure, some extra assumptions are needed. In
particular, it is necessary to avoid situations where two or more events are collapsed into a
single chain transition. For example, suppose that for some state j (beside the maximum
stock level S) the restocking quantity is equal to 0, that is, if a replenishment arrives
the stock level remains unchanged. In such case there exist two events that trigger a self
transition in j: a replenishment event and a non-purchase event. Suppose we “observe” one
self transition in state j and want to compute the posterior distribution of θ conditional on
the replenishment probability λ. The posterior is given by
p(θ | ht=ht−1 =j, λ) =
λ+ (1− λ)(1− θ)∫ 1
0 λ+ (1− λ)(1− θ̃)dθ̃
.
Note that the resulting distribution does not belong to any well known family of distributions
and hence the posterior sampling becomes difficult. In order to circumvent this issue we
assume, as specified in section 4.1.1, that all the replenishment transitions (except at the
maximum stock) strictly increment the stock.
Even under the assumption of strictly increasing replenishments, there exists one other
model feature that threatens the conjugate property of the parameters. Recall from section
4.1.1 that if a state i is in the replenishment region, i.e. i ≥ µ, the replenishment probability
distribution is given by
P{restocking level = k when ht = i} =
µk
µi+1 + . . .+ µS
, for k ≥ i+ 1.
Note that this likelihood form does not lead to a conjugate structure on the parameters
{µµ, . . . , µS}. One possible approach to assess this issue is to use some technique to sample
from a non-standard family of distributions, such as the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
and embed it in the Gibbs Sampler. We opt for a simpler solution that consists of ignoring
a fraction of the data, but without introducing any bias in the estimation. Our approach
works as follows: when sampling from the posterior distribution of {µµ, . . . , µS} we only
3This is due to the fact that Uniform and Beta are conjugate distributions.
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consider states that lie outside the replenishment region, that is states i < µ. For these
states, the replenishment distribution is given by
P{restocking level = k when ht = i} = µk,
and hence the conjugate structure is preserved. We stress the fact that ignoring a fraction
of the data in this manner does not introduce a bias in the estimation, because the selection
of the data is independent of the data itself. The only cost one has to incur is a less accurate
estimation, with the benefit of a substantially more time efficient algorithm.
The precise definition of all the posterior parameter distributions and how to compute
them is detailed in Appendix C.
Posterior sampling of states. Step 1 in the loop of the Gibbs Sampler involves sampling
from the hidden states of the Markov chain, given the parameters and the observed data.
Because the distribution of the states of the chain is conditional on the data, it is harder to
generate a sample path from the chain.4 Fortunately, there exists an efficient algorithm to
perform this task, known as the Forward Filtering Backward Sampling (FFBS) algorithm
(see, for example, [Scott, 2002]), which uses clever recursions to calculate the transition
probabilities of the chain given the observed data. We next detail the derivation of the
recursion formulas and the algorithm, specialized to our particular case.
The FFBS algorithm works by performing two passes. The first (forward) pass sequen-
tially calculates the transition probabilities of the chain, given the data up to time t − 1,
using the transition probabilities up to time t− 2. This is based on the following recursive
formula: let
pt(r, s) := P(ht−1 = r, ht = s | dt1), (4.1)




4This difference is similar to that of computing the likelihood of a particular sample path of a chain
(calculated as a simple product) versus computing the likelihood of a sample path given some observed
data, which is harder and requires clever computing techniques, such us the well known Viterbi algorithm.
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where dt1 := (d1, . . . , dt). Then
pt(r, s) =
P(ht−1 = r, ht = s, dt | dt−11 )∑





Based on these formulas, the forward pass calculates pt,r,s and πt(s) for all t, r, s. The
backwards (sampling) pass starts at the end of the time horizon by sampling from πT (·),
and uses each sampled state to generate the previous one. The FFBS algorithm is described
in Figure 4.4.
INPUT: d, Q, E, π0.
FORWARD PASS:










• Sample ĥT ∼ πT (·)
• For t = T − 1, . . . , 0
– Sample ĥt ∼ pt(·, ĥt+1)
OUTPUT: {ĥt}t=0,...,T
Figure 4.4: FFBS Algorithm.
4.2.2 Incorporating inventory information
The description of our methodology has so far been based on using purely transactional data.
However, with minor modifications one can directly incorporate inventory information in
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the estimation. Suppose that the retailer performs physical inventory inspections. Let us
denote by (t1, . . . , tK) the set of time periods where the inventory was inspected, and by
(ĥt1 , . . . , ĥtK ) the set of observed inventory levels. We can redefine equations (4.1) and (4.2)
in the following way:
pt(r, s) := P(ht−1 = r, ht = s | dt1, ĥt−11 ),




where ĥt1 := {ĥtk : tk ≤ t} represents the set of inventory inspections up to time t.
To adapt the recursion given in (4.3), we consider two cases. First suppose there is an
inventory inspection at time t− 1, that is, ht = ĥt−1. Then
pt(r, s) =
P(ht−1 = r, ht = s, dt | dt−11 , ht−1 = ĥt−1, ĥt−21 )∑
r,s P(ht−1 = r, ht = s, dt | dt−11 , ht−1 = ĥt−1, ĥt−21 )
=
I{r=ĥt−1}P(ht = s, dt | ht−1 = ĥt−1)∑





Now, suppose there is no inventory inspection at time t− 1, that is ĥt−11 = ĥt−21 . Then
pt(r, s) =
P(ht−1 = r, ht = s, dt | dt−11 , ĥt−21 )∑





Therefore, by replacing this definitions of pt(r, s) and πt(r) in the FFBS algorithm of Figure
4.4, the inventory inspections are successfully incorporated in our methodology.
As a final remark of this section, note that the derivation above was specialized to
events of the type {ht = ĥt}. It is not hard to modify the recursions to make them slightly
more general, and incorporate events of the type {ht ∈ At}, for some set of states At. As an
example of how this could be useful, consider the case of “Zero Balance Walk” inspections, as
studied in [Bensoussan et al., 2007], where the inspections only reveal whether the product is
in stock or not, that is {ht > 0}. By generalizing the recursion, one can directly incorporate
this type of partial inspections into the estimation procedure.
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4.3 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we present numerical study results for our proposed methodology. We
present an extensive simulation study, where we first evaluate performance with data gen-
erated from a perfectly specified model, and then we evaluate the method robustness with
respect to several misspecifications. We finally present a numerical study with actual retail-
ing data, and analyze the predictive power of our methodology in a real world environment.
4.3.1 Simulation Experiments
4.3.1.1 Perfect data specification examples
In the computational results of this section the data is generated according to the hidden
Markov model used in our proposed methodology. Because the data is generated exactly
following our assumptions, this examples can be used to assess the effectiveness of the
method in estimating the true model parameters, under perfect modeling assumptions.
From a practical point of view, we are also interested in understanding what is the impact
of not having (frequent) access to the actual inventory level; in other words, how effective
is this methodology in overcoming the fact that stock is only partially observable. To this
end we consider a benchmark estimation methodology with the same model assumptions as
before, but where the state of the chain is fully observable. This represents an ideal scenario
with no stock tracking inaccuracies, and perfectly known inventory at every point in time.
Recall from section 4.2.2 that our proposed methodology can incorporate stock inspection
data, so one could potentially use our proposed Gibbs Sampler to carry out this benchmark
estimation. However, for the case where the chain is fully observable the estimation of the
parameters becomes easier. For example, following a similar Bayesian approach as before,
the posterior distribution of the purchase probability θ is given by
p(θ|d) = Beta(1 + y, 1 + x− y),
where x := |{t : ht > 0}| and y := |{t : ht+1 = ht − 1}|. Note that in this case ht is
observable and hence there is no need to generate sample-paths from the chain. A similar
argument can be applied to obtain posterior distributions of the rest of the parameters of
the model.
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Figure 4.5 shows the output of the first set of experiments. The data was generated using
the following parameters: S = 10, θ = 0.5, ε = 0.95, µ = 0.05, µ = 8 and (µ8, µ9, µ10) =
(0, 1, 0). The Gibbs Sampler was run for 5000 iterations, with the first 1000 discarded as a
burnout period. Each plot in Figure 4.5 depicts the output of the estimation (expressed as
95% confidence interval) as a function of the time horizon (data size) T for the observable
and unobservable stock cases. The dashed horizontal line represents the true value of the
parameter.







95% CI for θ







95% CI for ε







95% CI for µ







95% CI for µ9
Observable Stock Unobservable Stock(Gibbs Sampler) True Value
Figure 4.5: Estimation results with observable and unobservable stock as a function of the
time horizon.
The results show that the unobservable stock makes the estimation harder when there is
a reduced number of data points, but our methodology is able to overcome this difficulty
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and produce comparable results to the full observation case for most parameters. Note
that the methodology gives a very good estimate with as few as 500 observations, except
for the replenishment value probability µ9. Recall from Section 4.2.1 that this behavior is
expected, due to the approach we use to estimate {µk}. Note, however, that this does not
affect the quality of the estimation for the rest of the parameters.
The parameters of the model are one of the two main estimation targets, the other one
is the unobservable states of the chain. Estimating the sample path of the chain is not only
necessary for our procedure, but also very relevant from a practical point of view. Having
a clear picture of the past stock levels can give the retailer very valuable insight on his
current inventory management practices. Figure 4.6 shows estimation of the unobservable
stock levels for the T = 100 and T = 500 examples of Figure 4.5. For display purposes,
the inventory levels have been classified in three regions: low (0 ≤ ht < S/3), medium
(S/3 ≤ ht < 2S/3) and high (2S/3 ≤ ht ≤ S), denoted by RL, RM and RH respectively.
The vertical lines represent the posterior probabilities of the stock being in a particular
region, while the horizontal thick line represents the actual stock level. One can readily
observe how the estimation in the T = 500 case improves substantially over the T = 100
case on the entire time horizon, the former giving a very accurate picture of the unobservable
sate of the chain in most periods. It is interesting to note how for the first 100 time periods,
where the simulated data is equal in both cases, the T = 500 case gives substantially better
results than the T = 100 case. This improvement comes only from adding extra future
data, which is weakly coupled with the first periods, but nevertheless helps substantially
improve the estimation.
4.3.1.2 Misspecified Simulation Examples
In this section we define a simulation model that more closely approximates a typical in-
ventory system evolution. We aim to understand how well our methodology adapts to
misspecifications in the data and, at the same time, assess its performance in a more real-
istic setting. We consider an inventory system with periodic inventory review and an (s, S)
replenish policy. The provider of the product visits the store at fixed time intervals (e.g.
weekly) and inspects the available stock of the product. If the stock is at or below s, it gets
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Figure 4.6: Estimation of unobservable stock levels for T = 100 and T = 500.
replenished up to level S, otherwise it remains unchanged. In order to make the scenario
more realistic, we further assume that the inspection time is not fully deterministic, but
rather subject to noise. Finally, on the demand side, we assume customers arrive according
to a Poisson process and they purchase the product under consideration with probability θ.
We consider two sets of policy parameters: (s, S) = (5, 5) and (s, S) = (15, 30). In each
case we fix the purchase probability at θ = 0.3 and consider four different review rates
{µ̃1, µ̃2, µ̃3, µ̃4}, where review rate is defined as the reciprocal of the review period. The
values of the review rates are given in the following table:
(s, S) µ̃1 µ̃2 µ̃3 µ̃4
(5,5) 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
(15,30) 0.0075 0.0085 0.0095 0.01
As stated above, we consider noisy realizations of the review periods, reflecting the fact
that, in practice, inventory reviews might not always follow a precise schedule (with weekly
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reviews, for example, the time of day may vary). More specifically, the review period, i.e.
the time between inventory reviews, will be given by (1−K)× 1/µ̃k, where K is a random
variable uniformly distributed in (0 ; 0.05), independently drawn for every inventory review.
In words, we allow for a 5% error in the actual timing of the review.
The numerical results of this section are organized in two classes: we fist consider in-
sample results, where we run our methodology with a generated dataset and analyze how
well unobservable statistics of the data can be approximated by the algorithm. We then
consider out-of-sample or predictive experimental results, where we use a dataset to fit
(or train) our model and evaluate how well our methodology predicts inventory status as
new data becomes available. The size of the generated dataset of transactions is given by
T = 3000 in all cases.
In-sample results: In the in-sample results we simulate a T = 3000 transaction horizon
for each of the instances described above. We then compute 95% confidence intervals for
the purchase probability θ and two useful unobservable statistics: the average percentage of
out of stock time periods (T + 1)−1
∑T
t=0 I{ht=0} and the average stock level, expressed as a
fraction of the maximum stock S: (T + 1)−1
∑T
t=0 ht/S. These quantities are of particular
interest for retailers, as they can be used to estimate two of the main drivers of inventory
costs: lost sales and holding costs.5
Figure 4.7 shows the results for the (s, S) = (5, 5) case. The two pictures on the
left display the estimation results for the purchase probability, the out-of-stock percentage
time and the average (fractional) stock level, expressed as 95% confidence intervals, and
their actual values. The pictures on the right display the stock level estimation for the
first 500 periods and their true values. Overall, the results show that the estimations
are remarkably accurate, especially considering the level of misspecification in the data
generation. With very limited information the algorithm is able to closely approximate the
purchase probability, which is the equivalent in our model to estimating demand, and give
a very good picture of the unobservable statistics of the data.
5The average holding cost can be calculated by multiplying the unit holding cost of an item and the
average stock level. The average lost sales cost can be approximated by multiplying the unit penalty cost of
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Figure 4.7: In-sample results for (s, S) = (5, 5).
Our next set of results corresponds to the (s, S) = (15, 30) case, presented in Figure
4.8. One can readily see from the upper left picture how the estimation of the purchase
probability is substantially less accurate than in the (s, S) = (5, 5) case. This is due to the
fact that high stock levels make the estimation harder: with high S the system will spend
most of its time in the intermediate states [1, S − 1], and the estimation requires frequent
visits to 0 and S to produce more accurate results. To understand why, note that when the
system is mostly in intermediate states, where both replenishes and purchases are possible,
there exists a degree of freedom in the parameters that could explain the data; roughly
speaking the likelyhood depends more on the ratio θ/µ than θ and µ, and the estimation
needs visits to 0 or S to resolve it. Despite these limitations, the model can still produce
a very accurate estimation for the out-of-stock fraction of time and, though overestimated,
a reasonable estimation of the average stock level. Moreover, as we will observe in the
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out-of-sample experiments, the algorithm will still be able to produce accurate predictions
despite not having precise estimates of the full set of parameters.
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Figure 4.8: In-sample results for (s, S) = (15, 30).
Out-of-sample results: We now turn our attention to out-of-sample experiments, where
the output of the algorithm is tested on data that was not used to fit the model. We aim
to evaluate the ability of the algorithm to predict the unobservable state of the system; in
particular we focus on out-of-stock (OOS) predictions. The experiments work as follows:
we generate a dataset of observations and we run the algorithm to compute estimates of
the model parameters using the first 3000 periods. With the estimated parameters6, we use
the forward filtering phase of the FFBS algorithm (see the “Forward Pass” in Figure 4.4) to
compute estimates of p(ht = 0|dt−11 ) for t greater than 3000. Note that the probabilities are
6To compute a concrete estimator of the parameters, we calculate the posterior sample mean using the
output of the Gibbs Sampler.
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calculated using only past data, emulating what would occur in a real world application.
Following a typical classification approach, we then set thresholds for p(ht = 0|dt−11 ) to
classify t as an in-stock or out-of-stock period and compare the result to the actual state.
As a benchmark method, we consider a natural classification procedure that makes out-of-
stock predictions based on the consecutive number of non-purchase periods. We call this
method the Naive classification method. It works simply by setting a threshold γ ∈ N and
classifying a period as out of stock if more than γ consecutive 0 were observed. Intuitively,
the number of consecutive non-purchase periods represents the main signal of out-of-stock
status, and hence it is natural to consider a classification scheme based on such signal.
Using this simple approach, however, has the disadvantage that no past data is used to help
recognize more complex patterns than a long sequence of consecutive non-purchases.
Based on the simulation model and instances described at the beginning of this section,
we computed the output of our Gibbs Sampler and the Naive method and constructed
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to test the effectiveness of the predictions.
Each point in the curve is associated with a threshold value: the abscissa represents the
fraction of in-stock periods that where (wrongly) classified as out-of-stock and the ordinate
is the fraction of out-of-stock periods that where (correctly) classified as out-of-stock by the
algorithm. ROC curves are commonly used to assess the trade-off between true positives
and false negatives in a classification methodology. The area under the ROC curve (AUC)
is also commonly computed as a measure of the overall quality of the method: a perfect
classification would give an AUC equal to 1 and a method that randomly classifies the
periods would give an AUC of 0.5 (in this case the ROC curve is given by a straight 45◦
line, usually included in ROC plots for reference).
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show results for the (s, S) = (5, 5) and (s, S) = (15, 30) instances,
respectively. One can readily observe from all the results that our proposed methodology
outperforms the Naive method in every instance. The differences are small and moderate
for the large stock examples, where both methods perform well. These instances seem to
have more easily recognizable patterns of in-stock and out-of-stock periods: long periods
of in-stock state are followed by periods of out-of-stock state (see for example the path
plots on Figure 4.8). The (s, S) = (5, 5) example, on the other hand, gives different results.
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Figure 4.9 shows that the Naive method performs very poorly on these cases, and is widely
outperformed by our Gibbs Sampler, which is able to attain comparable performance to
that of the high stock examples. This implies that, even though the low stock instances
represent harder examples, our methodology manages to recognize complex patterns in the
data and accurately differentiate between in-stock and out-of-stock periods.

















Review rate = µ1 (out-of-stock periods = 38%)

















Review rate = µ2 (out-of-stock periods = 16%)

















Review rate = µ2 (out-of-stock periods = 10%)

















Review rate = µ2 (out-of-stock periods = 5%)
Figure 4.9: Out-of-sample results for (s,S) = (5,5): ROC curves with their correspond-
ing Area Under the Curve (AUC) for the Gibbs Sampler and the Naive method.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide results for only one simulated instance in each plot. In
order to have a better picture of the predictive quality of the algorithms we ran 75 instances
for each case, and computed the AUCs of the algorithms’ output. The results are summa-
rized in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both tables confirm our prior conclusions: the Gibbs Sampler
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Review rate = µ1 (out-of-stock periods = 24%)

















Review rate = µ2 (out-of-stock periods = 17%)
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Review rate = µ2 (out-of-stock periods = 5%)
Figure 4.10: Out-of-sample results for (s,S) = (15,30): ROC curves with their corre-
sponding Area Under the Curve (AUC) for the Gibbs Sampler and the Naive method.
outperforms the Naive method in all cases, with more substantial differences in the low
stock examples. It is also interesting to note that the overall performance of our proposed
methodology seems to be relatively uniform across all examples, providing very good results
for different maximum stock levels and replenish frequencies, and strongly suggesting that
it is indeed a very suitable option to be applied in practice.
4.3.2 Retailing data examples:
We conclude our experimental results with retailing data experiments. The data used
for the experiments of this section was collected by Frogtek, a company devoted to pro-
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µk Mean Gibbs AUC Mean Naive AUC Mean rel. difference Avg % OOS periods
µ1 0.874 (±0.004) 0.655 (±0.006) 34 (±1)% 36%
µ2 0.864 (±0.005) 0.567 (±0.005) 53 (±1)% 19%
µ3 0.857 (±0.006) 0.486 (±0.006) 77 (±2)% 10%
µ4 0.835 (±0.016) 0.448 (±0.010) 88 (±5)% 6%
Table 4.2: Out-of-sample results for (s,S) = (5,5): Estimated mean AUC (with a 95%
confidence interval) of the Gibbs Sampler and Naive methods on 75 instances.
µk Mean Gibbs AUC Mean Naive AUC Mean rel. difference Avg % OOS periods
µ1 0.908 (±0.006) 0.882 (±0.006) 2.9 (±0.4)% 23%
µ2 0.904 (±0.010) 0.849 (±0.008) 6.6 (±1.3)% 14%
µ3 0.858 (±0.018) 0.794 (±0.019) 8.6 (±1.9)% 9%
µ4 0.862 (±0.017) 0.781 (±0.016) 10.8 (±2.2)% 6%
Table 4.3: Out-of-sample results for (s,S) = (15,30):Estimated mean AUC (with a
95% confidence interval) of the Gibbs Sampler and Naive methods on 75 instances.
viding information technology solutions for small retailers. Most of Frogtek’s clients are
micro-retailers who lack the infrastructure and resources to reliably track the stock of their
products. However, using Frogtek’s technology, it is possible to collect their POS data: for
every transaction the system stores, among other information, the retailer or point of sale
where the transaction took place, the products that where purchased and the transaction
timestamp. Note that this data is sufficient to generate the input to our procedure: us-
ing the timestamps one can order the transaction events (recall from section 4.1.2 that 1
events are given by purchases of the product under consideration and 0 events are given by
purchases of other products in the store) and obtain the input sequence d for the algorithm.
Since the data does not contain inventory information, it is not directly possible to
evaluate the predictive power of our methodology in this setting. Therefore, with the help
of Frogtek we selected a set of products and asked a retailer to survey the stock status of
those products daily for a period of 44 days. Based on Frogtek’s and the retailer’s expertise,
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we focused on high demand products, more likely to be subject to stockouts. The retailer
also reported an approximate maximum shelf space, which we used to set S while accounting
for some uncertainty (by setting µ < S). Table 4.4 below contains a summary of the result








Product 1 Soda can 12 17 44
Product 2 Heavy cream 6 8 44
Product 3 Mineral water 12 25 44
Product 4 Cigarettes 5 16 44
Table 4.4: Summary of the inventory survey.
Using the output of the survey we were able to test the predictive power of our method-
ology, in a similar manner to the out-of-sample experiments of section 4.3.1.2: for each
product we ran our methodology using data up to the start date of the survey and then
computed predictions in an out-of-sample manner, using the forward filtering mechanism.
The resulting ROC curves are depicted in Figure 4.11.
The results show that our methodology gives very good prediction results, outperforming
the Naive method in all cases. It is important to note that many of the out-of-stock
observations in these cases stem from unexpected supply chain events, such us problems
on the supplier side or the retailer not having enough funds to pay for the replenishment,
rather than a missmatch between supply and demand. This is reflected on the data as
unusually frequent and long sequences of out-of-stock periods, which makes our model less
able to fit the data and the naive method more effective. It is interesting to note then, that
even under these adverse conditions, our methodology is able to produce useful predictive
results.
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Figure 4.11: Experimental results for the retailing data experiments. Each plots
depicts ROC curves for the Gibbs Sampler and Naive methods
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In the present chapter we study the problem of using transactional data to estimate stock
levels when information about these is unavailable or unreliable. We developed a methodol-
ogy where we model the stock evolution as an unobservable quantity, and the only observable
data is given by purchase transactions. Because predicting stock levels is also predicting the
drivers of stock evolution, we also regard our method as means to estimate demand with
unreliable stock information. Through extensive experimental work that included simulated
and actual retailing data we were able to verify the effectiveness of our method even in the
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presence of sever misspecifications.
Our model was focused on first order out-of-stock signals, without accounting for cross-
product dependencies, which might provide useful information: a variation in the observed
purchase frequency of a product might indicate the out-of-stock status of a related product.
This is a worthwhile avenue of future research. Indeed, it could potentially not only improve
the accuracy of the stock prediction, but also correspondingly estimate more complex de-





In this thesis we explore the effects of uncertainty and learning on well-known operational
problems. We primarily focus on studying the challenges that arise when decisions have
to be made in the presence of uncertainty, and in particular when the outcome of those
decisions affects the way in which information is collected.
In chapters 2 and 3 we study two well known problems: the sequential newsvendor
problem and sequential auctions with incomplete private information. We focus on under-
standing the impact of the coupling between decisions and information collection and in par-
ticular on quantifying the exploration-exploitation trade-off that arises from this coupling.
Though different in nature, both problems have common properties that allow studying
them in similar frameworks. We find that in both cases the value of exploration is limited,
and a policy that ignores the information collection component of the problem can achieve
near-optimal performance in wide ranges of settings.
In our study of the newsvendor problem we find that the exploration-exploitation trade-
off is negligible in almost every case, with the exception of a very specific class of instances
where demand is roughly deterministic but unknown. In such setting, which can be essen-
tially regarded as degenerate, the value of exploring becomes non-trivial. Aside from those
cases, the general conclusion is that, for all practical purposes, the exploration-exploitation
trade-off can be disregarded.
Similarly, in the sequential auctions problem we find that the value of accounting for
the exploration-exploitation trade-off is limited, though this conclusion does not hold as
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exhaustively as in the newsvendor case. Indeed, in this problem is not hard to identify
examples in which being myopic with respect to information collection can be markedly
suboptimal. However, we are able to characterize a broad class of problem settings where
the myopic policy is nearly optimal, and we further show with examples that it includes
many practical cases, commonly studied in the literature.
Finally, in chapter 4 we study the problem of reducing uncertainty in inventory, when
access to stock information is limited or unreliable. We propose a model purely based on
Point of Sale data, where inventory is regarded as a virtually unobservable quantity that
can be inferred by observing sale patterns of the products. We find that our proposed
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A1 Proofs






will denote expectation with respect to the pair (θ,D), where θ ∼ Γ(a, S) is
the unknown parameter of demand, and D ∼ F (·|θ). In some cases, in order to avoid











denotes the single period optimal cost.
• Cot (a, S) represents the future expected one period cost, t + 1 periods in the future,
when demands are observable. That is, Cot (a, S) := E
[












denotes the single period optimal cost when θ is known.
We also will denote Co∞(a, S) := E [C(θ)].
• The myopic order quantity ym(a, S) is defined as ym(a, S) := M−1(r|a, S). The
myopic order quantity when θ is known is denoted as ym(θ) := F−1(r|θ).
In the Weibull case these can be explicitly written as
ym(a, S) := S1/`
(
(1− r)−1/a − 1
)1/`
and ym(θ) := θ−1/`(− log(1− r))1/` respectively.
The proofs rely on a set of shorter technical lemmas presented in Appendix A2.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1. We will establish the result of Lemma 2.1 for general newsvendor
distributions. Define, for this proof only,
F (x|θ) := 1− e−θd(x),




where d : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is a differentiable, increasing and unbounded function.1
In the general newsvendor distribution case, one has
V mT (a, S) = C(a, S) + Ea,S [V mT−1(a+ 1, S + d(D))] + ΓT−1(a, S), (A.1)
where
ΓT−1(a, S) := (1− r)V mT−1(a, S + d(ym))− Ea,S [V mT−1(a+ 1, S + d(D))I{D≥ym}],
and ym represents the myopic order quantity. Here, with some slight abuse of notation, we
keep the same notation as in the Weibull case in the main text. To lighten notation, we
omit the dependency of ym on a and S; in what follows, ym always represents the myopic
order quantity with respect to a and S, that is ym = d−1(S[(1− r)−1/a − 1]).
First note that, by Lemma A2.3,








ΓT (a, S) (A.3)
= (1− r)V mT (a, S + d(ym))− (1− r)Ea,S [V mT (a+ 1, S + d(D))|D ≥ ym]
= (1− r)
[
C(a, S + d(ym)) + Ea,S+d(ym)[V mT−1(a+ 1, S + d(ym) + d(D))] +




C(a, S + d(ym)) + Ea,S+d(ym)[V mT−1(a+ 1, S + d(ym) + d(D))] +
ΓT−1(a, S + d(ym))− Ea,S+d(ym)[V mT
(





1Note that d(·) is defined to be nondecreasing in page 20 of the paper. To make the exposition more
clear in this proof, and that of Lemma A2.3, we assume d(·) to be strictly increasing, though the proof can
be extended to the more general case by defining, for example, d−1(z) := inf{y|d(z) = y}.
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where the second equality follows from expanding V mT (a, S+d(y
m)) according to (A.1) and
the third inequality follows from applying equation (A.2) to the last term in the second
equation. Define
Cmt (a, S) := V
m
t+1(a, S)− V mt (a, S), for t = 0, . . . , T.
Cmt (a, S) represents the future expected cost t+1 periods in the future, if the myopic policy
is applied, and we start with hyperparamters a and S. One can then rewrite (A.4) as
ΓT (a, S) = (1− r)
[
C(a, S + d(ym)) + ΓT−1(a, S + d(ym))




C(a, S(1− r)−1/a) + ΓT−1(a, S(1− r)−1/a)
− Ea,S(1−r)−1/a [CmT−1(a+ 1, S(1− r)−1/a + d(D))]
]
,
where the last equality comes from the fact that S + d(ym) = S(1 − r)−1/a. By repeating
the argument, one obtains














































The inequality is due to the fact that for any t ≥ 1, Cot (a, S) ≤ Cmt (a, S), a fact we formally
prove in Lemma A2.4. This completes the proof.
  
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof is based on first bounding the difference V mT (a, S) −
V oT (a, S) by the difference V
o
T−1(a, S)− (T − 1)Co∞(a, S) properly scaled. We then derive a
bound on the latter difference.
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Specializing the bound on ΓT (a, S) given in Lemma 2.1 for the Weibull case, one obtains






















[C(a, S)− Co∞(a, S)] , (A.5)
where (a) follows from the scalability property and (b) follows from the fact that Cot (a, S) ≥
Co∞(a, S) for any t = 0, . . . , T .
2
By equation (A.1), page 96, specialized to the Weibull case, we have
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) = Ea,S
[
V mT−1(a+ 1, S +D
`)− V oT−1(a+ 1, S +D`)
]
+ ΓT−1(a, S).
If we denote D̂`t := D
`
1 + . . .+D
`
t and proceed recursively, we obtain












































V oT−1(a, S)− (T − 1)Co∞(a, S)
)
, (A.7)
where the inequality follows by (A.5).
We now bound the difference V oT−1(a, S)− (T − 1)Co∞(a, S). For that we rely on lemma
2It is not hard to derive this fact from the definition of Cot (a, S) and C
o
∞(a, S). Intuitively, if θ is known
there is always less demand uncertainty than if θ is unknown (even after any number of demand observations)





A2.5 that bounds the difference Cot (a, S)− Co∞(a, S) of costs in the observable case.
































a− 1/`) + (a− 1/l)
−1]. (A.8)
Let us now define
Q(a, r, `) := [K(r, `)]`
exp{1/(a− 1/`)}
a− 1/` .
Note that, because exp{x} ≤ 1 + (e− 1)x for any x ∈ (0, 1), we have that
exp{1/(a− 1/`)}













Therefore, Q(a, r, `) = O(1/a) when r and ` are fixed.
By substituting Q(a, r, `) in (A.8) and combining the inequality with (A.7), we obtain
the result of the theorem and the proof is complete.
  
Proof of Proposition 2.1. As stated in the proof of Theorem 2.1, it is not hard to show
that Cot (a, S) ≥ Co∞(a, S) for all t. Therefore,
V oT (a, S) :=
T−1∑
t=0





Combining the latter with the result of Theorem 2.1, one obtains
V mT (a, S)− V oT (a, S)
V oT (a, S)
≤ S1/` [Q(a, r, `)]1/` λ− λ
T+1
1− λ









Proof of Proposition 2.2. Note that, since the myopic value of information is indepen-
dent of S (cf. the scalability property), the statement is equivalent to
V mT (a, a)− V oT (a, a)







We start by showing that V oT (a, a) is lower bounded by a positive constant for any a. Since
V oT (a, S) :=
T−1∑
t=0
Cot (a, S), it suffices to show that each term C
o
t (a, a) is lower bounded by a
positive constant itself,











































F (x|1)dx > 0,
where the first equality follows from Lemma A2.1 and the second inequality is a result of
Jensen’s inequality applied to the expectation term. The last equality follows from the fact
that Ea,a [θ] = 1. We then have shown that











=: m > 0.
Using Theorem 2.1 one obtains
V mT (a, a)− V oT (a, a)
V oT (a, a)
≤ λ− λ
T+1














Proof of Proposition 2.3. Following the inequality given in (A.7), in the proof of Theo-
rem 2.1 (page 98), it suffices to show that
λ− λT+1
1− λ


















as r → 0+.
(A.9)
where λ := (1− r)1− 1a` .
Note: for this proof, all expectations are taken with respect to hyperparameters a and S,
that is, E[·] ≡ Ea,S [·].
i.) We start with the case r → 1−. Let us start by noting that (λ − λT+1)/(1 − λ) =
O((1 − r)1−1/a`) as r → 1− and hence, it suffices, for example, to show that the ratio







→ 0, as r → 1−.
It is not hard to see that both numerator and denominator converge to infinity as r → 1−.
We can therefore apply L’Hôpital’s rule and differentiate both terms with respect to r.





























































































where the second equality is a result of the chain rule and the fundamental theorem of
calculus applied to the integral term.
















where St := S +D
`
1 + . . .+D
`

























(T − 1)(1− r) ∂∂rE [ym(θ)]∑T−2
















(1− r)−1/at − 1
)1/`−1
a−1t (1− r)−1/at−1
where (a) follows from applying L’Hôpital’s rule, (b) follows from applying L’Hôpital’s rule
and interchanging differentiation and expectation3 and (c) is a result of applying L’Hôpital’s
to the right side of (b) . Elementary calculus (in particular, repetitively applying L’Hôpital’s
rule to the ratio) yields that the last limit is equal to 0, and hence the r → 1− case is
complete.
ii.) We now analyze the case r → 0+. Let us start by noting that, following (A.9) and
noting that (λ− λT+1)/(1− λ)→ T as r → 0+, it suffices to show that
lim
r→0+





exists and is finite.
Defining the following notation











By following similar arguments as the ones used in i.) one can show that

















= E [E[D|θ]] = E [D] < ∞. A similar
argument justifies the interchange in the denominator.
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a) Both numerator and denominator in (A.10) converge to 0 as r → 0+.
b) lim
r→0+
f ′(r) = lim
r→0+
g′(r) = (T − 1)E[D].
c) The second derivatives of f(·) and g(·) are given by
f ′′(r) =
2









































(1− r)−1/at − 1
)1/`−1
(1− r)−1/at ,












r−1g(r) = (T − 1)E[D]. (A.11)
This implies that, if we take derivatives in (A.10) both the numerator and denominator






(1` − 1)1` r−1f(r) + 2l f ′(r) + rf ′′(r)
] (A.12)

















































=: K ∈ R++,
where K > 0 follows from Jensen’s inequality and the law of iterated expectations (see page















→ 0, the proof is complete. If ` < 1, we can













where the second equality follows from applying (A.14) and the expressions for f̃ ′(r) and
g̃′(r). Hence (A.13) is established.
Now, by combining (A.13) and (A.11) above, one obtains that the limit in (A.12) is
finite. This completes the proof.
  
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Suppose demands are exponential and a > 1. The proof relies
on an alternative informational system. In the random rejection system, at each step the
decision maker obtains either a full demand observation, independently of the order quantity
y and with probability r, or no observation at all, with probability 1 − r. Because in this
case the information collection is independent of the decision process, a myopic policy is
optimal, and the optimal cost is given by the solution to the Bellman equation
V rT (a, S) := C(a, S) + rE
[
V rT−1(a+ 1, S +D)
]
+ (1− r)V rT−1(a, S).
It is not hard to show (by, for example, following similar steps to those in the proof
of Proposition 2.4 for ` = 1) that the cost function for the random rejection system also
satisfies the scalability property, that is,
V rT (a, S) = SV
r
T (a, 1), for any T ≥ 1, S > 0, a > 1.
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By using this fact and the fact that, for the exponential case, Ea,S [D] = S/(a− 1) one can
rewrite the recursive formula for V rT (a, S) as




T−1(a+ 1, S) + (1− r)V rT−1(a, S). (A.15)
To establish Theorem 2.2, we will establish the two following inequalities.
a) V mT (a, S) ≥ V rT (a, S) ≥ V oT (a, S).










− T − 2
a+ T − 2
]
.
a) The second inequality follows directly from the fact that full observations is a more
informative system than random rejections. We prove the first inequality, V mT (a, S) ≥
V rT (a, S), in two steps.
Step 1. We first establish the following cost relationship in the rejection system.




T (a+ 1, S).
We proceed by induction in T . The case T = 1 follows from the fact that V r1 (a, S) = C(a, S)




T−1(a + 1, S) for all a > 1.
Using the recursive equation for V rT (a, S) one can write








T (a+ 1, S) =
a












The base case implies that the first term on the right side of the first equation dominates the
first term in the right side of the second equation. Similarly, by the induction hypothesis,
the two last terms in the right side of the first equation dominate the corresponding terms
in the right side of the second equation and hence the inequality is established.
Step 2. We now prove the inequality we are after, V mT (a, S) ≥ V rT (a, S), by induction
on T . If T = 1 the result follows from the fact that V m1 (a, S) = V
r
1 (a, S) = C(a, S).
Suppose that V mT−1(a, S) ≥ V rT−1(a, S). Then




1− (1− r)1− 1a
)
V mT−1(a+ 1, S) + (1− r)1−
1
aV mT−1(a, S)
≥ C(a, S) + a
a− 1
(
1− (1− r)1− 1a
)





where the first equality follows from Proposition 2.4, page 29, applied to ` = 1.
Using the inequality above and Bellman’s recursion for V rT (a, S) in (A.15)




1− (1− r)− 1a
)
V rT−1(a+ 1, S) +
(1− r)
(
(1− r)− 1a − 1
)
V rT−1(a, S)
≥ (1− r) a
a− 1
(
1− (1− r)− 1a
)




(1− r)− 1a − 1
)
V rT−1(a+ 1, S)
= 0
where the second inequality follows from step 1 above. This completes the induction step
and a) is established.
b) We first rewrite the full observation and random rejection value functions for the expo-
nential case:









T−1(a+ 1, S) + (1− r)V rT−1(a, S)



















V rT−1(a+ 1, S)− V oT−1(a+ 1, S)
]
.
By proceeding recursively one obtains
V rT (a, S)− V oT (a, S) =
T−2∑
k=0
a+ k − 1
a− 1 Γ
r
T−k−1(a+ k, S). (A.16)
Lemma A2.8, presented in Appendix A2, states that
ΓrT (a, S) ≥
1− r
a− 1 [(a− 1)C(a, S)− (a+ T − 1)C(a+ T, S)] . (A.17)
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By combining (A.16) and (A.17) one obtains





[(a+ k − 1)C(a+ k, S)− (a+ T − 2)C(a+ T − 1, S)]
(a)









a+ T − 1
]








− T − 1
a+ T − 1
]




log(a+ T − 2)− log(a) + 1
a
− T − 1
a+ T − 1
]
,
where (a) follows from Lemma A2.9.c) in appendix A2. This completes the proof.
  
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We proceed by induction. For T = 1 we have V m1 (a, S) =
C(a, S) and the result holds by Lemma A2.2.
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Suppose that the result holds for T − 1. Then
V mT (a, S) := C(a, S) +
∫ ym(a,S)
0




a, S + [ym(a, S)]`
)
= C(a, S) +
∫ ym(a,S)
0
(S + z`)1/`m(z|a, S)dz V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) +
(1− r)
[
S + [ym(a, S)]`
]1/`
V mT−1(a, 1)







dz V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) +
(1− r)S1/`(1− r)−1/a` V mT−1(a, 1)










V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) +
S1/`(1− r)1−1/a` V mT−1(a, 1)






V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) +








V mT−1(a+ 1, 1) +
(1− r)1−1/a` V mT−1(a, 1)
]
,
where the second equality follows from the inductive hypothesis applied to V mT−1(a+1, S+z
`)
and V mT−1(a, S + [y
m(a, S)]`), and the third equality follows from the definition of ym(a, S).













C(a, S) = E[L(ym(a, S), D)]
= E[(ym(a, S)−D)+] + r
1− rE[(D − y
m(a, S))+]








(D − ym(a, S))+
]












This completes the proof for C(a, S). The proof for C(θ) is analogous.
  
The following Lemma has been proven in the literature (see, for example, [Azoury,
1985]), but we include a proof here for completeness:
Lemma A2.2 (Scalability). Suppose demands are Weibull and a` > 1, then
C(a, S) = S1/`C(a, 1).













The myopic order quantity is given by ym(a, S) = S1/`
(
(1− r)−1/a − 1
)1/`
and hence






























Similarly, it is not hard to show that
∫ ∞
0

















This completes the proof.
  
Lemma A2.3. Let (D, θ) follow a Newsvendor distribution with parameters (a, S), and
(D′, θ) a Newsvendor distribution with parameters (a, S + d(y)). For any x, y ≥ 0,
P
(




d(y) + d(D′) ≥ x
)
.
In words, this lemma states that the conditional distribution of d(D), given that D is
greater than y, is equivalent to the unconditional distribution of d(y) + d(D′), where D′
follows the resulting distribution after having one censored observation at y.
Proof. We start by showing the following equivalence:
P
(




d(y) + d(D′) ≥ x
)
∀x, y ≥ 0 (A.18)
⇔ P
(




d(y′) + d(D′) ≥ d(x′)
)
∀x′, y′ ≥ 0. (A.19)
To show necessity note that, given x, if there exists x′ such that d(x′) = x the result follows
immediately by setting x′ := d−1(x) and y′ := y. If no such x′ exists, this means, since d(·)
is increasing and unbounded, that x < d(0). But this implies that the events {d(D) ≥ x}
and {d(y) + d(D′) ≥ x} equal the entire sample space, and hence both sides of equation
(A.18) equal 1. This completes the proof for the necessity implication; the sufficiency can
be proven by analogous arguments.
We now give a proof of equation (A.19). If x′ < y′ both sides of equation (A.19) are equal
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to 1 and the result holds. Suppose that x′ ≥ y′. Then
P
(















P(D ≥ y′|θ)π(θ|a, S)
P(D ≥ y′) dθ, (A.20)
where the first equality comes from the fact that the events {D ≥ y′} and {d(D) ≥ d(y′)}
are equivalent, and x′ ≥ y′ implies d(x′) ≥ d(y′).
Note that the second fraction inside the integral in (A.20) is equivalent to the posterior
distribution of θ, given a censored observation of D ≥ y. That is,
P(D ≥ y′|θ)π(θ|a, S)
P(D ≥ y′) = π(θ|a, S + d(y
′)),
where the equality follows from the Bayes update rule of a censored observation in the





P(D ≥ y′|θ)π(θ|a, S)

















d(D) ≥ d(x′)− d(y′)|θ
)
π(θ|a, S + d(y′))dθ
= P
(
d(y′) + d(D′) ≥ d(x′)
)
,
where the third equality comes from the fact that the distribution of d(D) conditional on θ
is exponential with parameter θ. This completes the proof.
  
Lemma A2.4. For any t ≥ 0 we have
Cmt (a, S) ≥ Cot (a, S).
Proof. To simplify the exposition, we will write the proof for t = 1, that is, one period in
the future. The extension to general t follows with similar reasonings.
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Suppose D1 represents the demand realization in the first period. One can write the future
costs as








































































By combining (A.22) and (A.23) one obtains


















= Cm1 (a, S).
This completes the proof.
  
Lemma A2.5. Suppose Demand is Weibull, with a` > 1. For any a, S, l, r and t = 1, . . . , T






where K(r, `) is a constant depending only on r and l.
Proof. Let (D1, . . . , DT ) denote the vector of demands, over the time horizon, and let
St := S +D
`
1 + . . .+D
`
t and at := a+ t.
By Lemma A2.1 one has















− Ea,S [E[D|θ]] .
112
APPENDIX A
Note that the last terms on the right side of both equations above are equal to Ea,S [D].
Therefore, by subtracting both equations one obtains














































where the last equality follows from the change of variable u := x`/St and u := θx
` in the
first and second integrals, respectively.


























Returning to (A.24), one obtains





















































































> − log(1 − r) > 0 (see, for example, Lemma
A2.9.a). The last inequality follows from the fact that the first integrand is grater than or
equal to the second one.
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= (at + 1)










≤ Γ(1/`+ 1)K̂(1/`+ 1) 1
at − 1/`
, (A.26)
where the first equality follows from basic properties of the Gamma and Beta functions4
(see, for example, [Abramowitz and others, 1964], Chapter 6) and the last inequality follows
from Lemma A2.6. In particular, K̂(·) is defined in (A.28).
Therefore (A.25) and (A.26) yield


































This completes the proof.
  












du, and letting x := 1/` + 1 and
y := at − 1/`.
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Lemma A2.6. Let a, b be positive real numbers such that a > b. Then
abΓ(a− b)
Γ(a)
− 1 ≤ K̂(b)
a− b ,





0 if x = 0,
x
(
K̂(x− 1) + 1
)
if x ∈ N,
K̂(bxc) + x− bxc if x ∈ R \ N.
(A.28)
Proof. i.) If 0 ≤ b < 1 the results follows directly from a traditional bound on the gamma
function, first developed by [Wendel, 1948] (a proof can be found in [Qi and Losonczi,
2010]).5
ii.) Suppose b = n ∈ N, the result follows from the inequality (A.29) we establish next
and the factorial property of the gamma function: Γ(x) = (x− 1)Γ(x− 1) ∀x ≥ 1.
Let n ∈ N and a ∈ R+ such that a > n. We establish the following inequality by
induction on n:
an
(a− 1)(a− 2) . . . (a− n) − 1 ≤
K̂(n)
a− n, (A.29)
where K̂(n) was defined in (A.28). The base case, n = 1, is trivial. Suppose the inequality
holds for n− 1, then
an
(a− 1)(a− 2) . . . (a− n) − 1 =
an−1
(a− 1)(a− 2) . . . (a− (n− 1))
a





a− n+ 1 + 1
)
a
a− n − 1
=
(
K̂(n− 1) + a− n+ 1
)
a− (a− n+ 1)(a− n)
(a− n+ 1)(a− n)
=
aK̂(n− 1) + (a− n+ 1)n



















for any 0 < s < 1 and x > 0. Case i.) can
be derived from this bound by letting x := a− b and s := b.
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where (a) is a consequence of the induction hypothesis, (b) follows by the recursive definition
of K̂(n) and (c) is a result of the fact that a/n ≤ a−n+1 for all a ≥ n ≥ 0. This concludes
the induction argument.


































a− n− ε + 1
=
K̂(n) + b− bbc
a− b + 1
=
K̂(b)
a− b + 1
where in the first inequality, we have use (A.29) and in the second inequality, we have used
the fact that ε < 1. This completes the proof.
  
Lemma A2.7. Fix S > 0 and a > 1/`. Let D1, . . . , Dt be iid random variables, Weibull
distributed with parameter θ ∼ Gamma(a, S). Then
E
[(

















(S + z`)m(z|a, S)dz = S1/`
∫ ∞
0




Therefore, one has that
E
[(








S +D`1 + . . .+D
`
t









(1 + z`)m(z|a+ t− 1, 1)dz
= E
[(
S +D`1 + . . .+D
`
t−1
)1/`] (a+ t− 1)`
(a+ t− 1)`− 1 .
Continuing recursively one obtains
E
[(










(a+ 1)`− 1 . . .
(a+ t− 1)`



















`a− 1 + `k
)





`a− 1 + `k
}


















































which concludes the proof.
  
Lemma A2.8. Suppose demand are exponential. Let
ΓrT (a, S) := (1− r)
[









Then, for any a > 1, T ≥ 1, S > 0 and r ∈ (0, 1)
ΓrT (a, S) ≥
1− r
a− 1 [(a− 1)C(a, S)− (a+ T − 1)C(a+ T, S)] .
Proof. We proceed by induction on T . The base case, T = 1, follows directly from the
definition of Γr1(a, S). Suppose the result holds for T − 1. Then
ΓrT (a, S)






T (a+ 1, S)








C(a+ 1, S) + r
a+ 1
a














a− 1 [(a− 1)C(a, S)− aC(a+ 1, S)] +
r
a− 1 [aC(a+ 1, S)− (a+ T − 1)C(a+ T, S)] +
(1− r)
a− 1 [(a− 1)C(a, S)− (a+ T − 2)C(a+ T − 1, S)]
=
1




(a− 1)C(a, S)− aC(a+ 1, S) +
(a+ T − 1)C(a+ T, S)− (a+ T − 2)C(a+ T − 1, S)
]
≥ 1
a− 1 [(a− 1)C(a, S)− (a+ T − 1)C(a+ T, S)] ,
where the first inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis and the second inequality
follows from the fact that the function f(x) := (x−1)C(x, S) is a decreasing convex function
(see Lemma A2.9 below). This completes the induction step.
  
Lemma A2.9. Let f : (1,+∞)→ R, defined as f(a) := (a−1)C(a, 1) = a
[
(1− r)−1/a − 1
]
.
Then, for every a > 1







for any a > 1.
b) f(·) is decreasing and convex.
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, for any b ≥ a.
Proof. a)
f(a) + log(1− r) = a
[
(1− r)−1/a − 1] + log(1− r)
= a
[





















where the third equality follows from the Taylor exp of ex.
b) Follows directly from a), since the terms in the sum are positive, decreasing and convex
functions.


















ΓT (π) := E[V mT (π ⊕X)]− V mT (π)
= E[V mT (π ⊕X)]−
[
Q(π) + q(µ(π))E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)] + (1− q(µ(π)))V mT−1(π)
]
= E[V mT (π ⊕X)]− E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)]−Q(π) +
(1− q(µ(π)))
[
E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)]− V mT−1(π)
]
= E[V mT (π ⊕X)]− E[V mT−1(π ⊕X)]−Q(π) + (1− q(µ(π)))ΓT−1(π)
= E[QmT (π ⊕X)]−Q(π) + (1− q(µ(π)))ΓT−1(π),
where Qmt (π) represents the future one period reward, t+1 periods in the future, when the



























Lemma B.2. Suppose π(·), X and R(X) are defined as in the Example 3.3, in Section
3.2.1, and suppose 1/q(x) := O(x−α), with a+ α > 2 and s1 > α+ 1. Then
E
[
q−1(µ(πot )) Varν̂∼πot (µν̂)
]
= O(1/t).
Proof. Let us start by recalling that
µν := E[R(X)|ν] = νε ν−1Y





and the Bayesian updates are given by

















Varν̂∼π(µν̂) := E[µ2ν ]− E[µν ]2























where (i) comes from the expressions for the first and second moments of the Beta and










a+ tε − 1
)2(
1
s1 + s2 + t+ 1
a+ tε − 1
a+ tε − 2
+
1







a+ tε − 1
)2−α(
s1 + tε
















k=1 Yk, by conditioning on tε in (B.1) the first term can
be show to be bounded if α + a > 2 for any tε, following the same arguments of Example


































where the last equality comes from applying the same arguments as in Example 3.1 to the
expectation term.
  
Lemma B.3. Suppose bm(x) is defined as the optimal bid in a first price auction. If
q′(x) = Θ(xα−1) as x→ 0. then
1/q ◦ bm(x) = O(x−α) as x→ 0.
Proof. Recall that bm(x) can be defined as the solution to
q′(b)(x− b) = q(b). (B.2)
Because q′(x) = Θ(xα−1), by integrating one has that q(x) = Θ(xα). By using these two
facts on (B.2) one can conclude that x− bm(x) = Θ(bm(x)) and hence that bm(x) = Θ(x).
Therefore






This implies that 1/q(bm(x)) = O(x−α), which completes the proof.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Posterior distributions of model parameters
Section 4.2.1 describes how the distribution of the purchase probability θ is updated by
observing downwards transitions of the chain. This is a particular case of the Multinomial-
Dirichlet conjugate structure, which applies to the rest of the parameters of our model: ε,µ,
and {µi}. We next define the posterior updates for all the parameters:
θ | h, d ∼ Beta(1 + Purchases, 1 +NonPurchases)
ε | h, d ∼ Beta(1 +ObservedPurchases, 1 + UnobservedPurchases)
µ | h, d ∼ Beta(1 +Replenishes, 1 +NonReplenishes)
{µj}j=µ,...,S | h, d ∼ Dirichlet({1 +ReplenishLevelj}j=µ,...,S),
where,
Purchases := |{t : ht = ht−1 − 1}|
NonPurchases := |{t : ht = ht−1 ∧ ht−1 > 0}|
ObservedPurchases := |{t : ht = ht−1− 1 ∧ dt−1 = 1}|
UnobservedPurchases := |{t : ht = ht−1− 1 ∧ dt−1 = 0}|
Replenishes := |{t : ht > ht−1}|
NonReplenishes := |{t : ht <= ht−1 ∧ ht−1 < S}|
ReplenishLevelj := |{t : ht > ht−1 ∧ ht = j ∧ ht−1 < µ}|.
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Note how in the definition of NonPurchases we only consider in-stock periods, since pur-
chases are not observable in the out-of-stock state. Similarly, NonReplenishes only consid-
ers states below the maximum stock level. Finally, note in the definition of ReplenishLevelj
how we only consider replenish events with a state below µ (see section 4.2.1 in the paper
for a discussion).
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